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Ethos as a Technical Means of Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory

That ethos, or the speaker's character, should be regarded as an efficient means of persuasion in eloquence seems only natural. Much less so, that it should be considered a technical means in the sense that it may be devised, shaped and administered by the speaker's own skill. For we all know that any argument will be far more convincing when uttered by a person of high reputation, good intelligence, and great reliability. But we would probably regard these factors as given prerequisites rather than as matter open to free manipulation by the orator. Even if we were prepared to accept the possibility of some manipulation there, we would at least not consider it desirable.

Ancient rhetoricians, too, recognized that the ethos of the speaker was an important means of persuasion or "source of conviction"¹ They, however, from Aristotle onwards, clearly ranked it among 'technical' proofs (πίστεις ἔντεχνολ) which were to be supplied by the logos itself.² We shall see in the following that Aristotle, in developing his theory on ethos, in some respects departs from the views of his predecessors, but that, on the other hand, he was also able to draw on earlier concepts and ideas. In a second step, we shall try to show what became of Aristotle's neatly arranged concept of ethos later on in the course of the history of rhetoric, especially in Cicero and Quintilian. For this purpose, it will be useful, throughout, to remember that three different kinds of characters are, at least potentially, involved in the rhetorical situation: the speaker's (or his or her client's), the opponent's, and the audience's.

Δόξα τοῦ λέγοντος – The Pre-Aristotelian View

In the first chapter of his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle criticizes his predecessors in rhetorical theory for not having paid the least attention to the enthymeme, which for him is "the body of proof" (σῶμα τῆς πίστεως), and for having dealt instead with things not really pertinent to the subject of rhetoric (ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος).³ But while in this respect he severely and lengthily censures them for having made excessive use of appeals to emotion (pathos),⁴ he does not say anything about ethos. Are we to infer from Aristotle's silence, that ethos did not play any significant part in his predecessors' teachings? Probably so, but we should be careful; he might as well have been of the opinion that ethos was not among those matters "outside the subject",

¹ Eugene E Ryan, *Aristotle's Theory of Rhetorical Argumentation* (Collection Noël, Montreal: Bellarmin, 1984), 173.

² Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 2, 1355b35; 1356a1-2.

³ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 1, 1453a11-16.

while pathos was,⁵ although we might in this case expect him to have stated as much somewhere.

In fact, there are traces of ethos in pre-Aristotelian rhetoric. The oldest and most important one is found in the so-called *Rhetoric to Alexander*, a treatise transmitted within the works of Aristotle, but today commonly ascribed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus. This work, which is to be dated around the middle of the 4th century B.C.E. and is thus roughly contemporary to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, is probably the only remainder of a pre-Aristotelian tradition of rhetorical handbooks based on the teachings of the sophists.

Anaximenes classifies rhetorical proofs (πίστεις) not as Aristotle does into technical and non-technical ones, but into proofs arising from words, actions and persons themselves and additional or supplementary (ἐπιθέτοι) proofs.⁶ At first sight, this would seem roughly the same distinction as Aristotle's, especially as probabilities, examples, signs and enthymemes appear among the first group and most of the supplementary proofs are identical with Aristotle's non-technical ones (witnesses, tortures, oaths), with one notable exception:

Anaximenes knows of one peculiar kind of proof, which he calls the δόξα of the speaker (δόξα τοῦ λέγοντος), and which he also lists among the additional proofs.⁷ To understand more clearly, what he means by this, let us look at his more detailed description (Anaximenes, *Rhetoric* 14, 1431b9-19, which I give in English translation, roughly following H. Rackham's with some alterations, but, for certain reasons, leaving the word δόξα untranslated for the moment):

The δόξα of the speaker is the exhibition of his own intelligence (διάνοια) in accordance with subject matter. He must show that he is experienced in the matters about which he is talking, and must further prove that it is to his interest to speak the truth about them; and one who is contradicting must, if possible, prove that his adversary has no experience of the matters about which he is nevertheless pronouncing an opinion (δόξα). If this is not possible, he must show that even experts are often quite mistaken; and should this not be feasible, he must say that it is against his opponents' interest to speak the truth about the matter in question. This is how we shall use the opinions (δόξα) of the speaker, both when declaring our own and when contradicting other people.

⁴ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 1, 1453a16-26.

⁵ It is a well-known paradox that Aristotle here places pathos among things outside rhetoric, while in I 2 he includes it among the technical means of persuasions and treats it at some length in book II 1-11; these passages may represent different layers in the history of the composition of the *Rhetoric*, see Friedrich Solmsen, *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik* (Neue philologische Untersuchungen 4, Berlin: Weidmann, 1929), 208ff.

⁶ Anaximenes, *Rhetoric* 7, 1428a16-26.

⁷ Anaximenes, *Rhetoric* 14, 1431b9; supplemented, as almost necessary, in 7, 1428a23 by L. Spengel. See Wilhelm Süß, *Ethos. Studien zur älteren griechischen Rhetorik* (Leipzig, 1910), 116ff.

What exactly is meant by the speaker's δόξα? The Greek expression, of course, is ambiguous. Depending on whether we take τοῦ λέγοντος to be a subjective or an objective genitive, it will mean either the speaker's own opinion or else the opinion about the speaker, the speaker's reputation. Anaximenes' explanation, unfortunately, is not very clear either. In some passages, where he speaks about pronouncing a δόξα, he indeed seems to refer to the speaker's private opinion, especially so in the last sentence, where the plural (δόξαι) is used. But on the other hand, when he says that the speaker should present himself to the audience as experienced in the matter at stake and as trustworthy (the opponent, by contrast, as inexperienced and untrustworthy), this sounds rather like Aristotle's description of ethos. Moreover, δόξα of course may mean either 'intelligence, intellectual capacity', as I have translated, or 'opinion, view', as Rackham does ("pronouncement of his own view about things").

Fortunately, there is an elucidating similar passage in Isocrates' late so-called antidosis speech, which is dated in 354 B.C.E. and thus almost contemporary to Anaximenes' treatise. There Isocrates states (Or. 15.278, transl. G. Nordin):

The man who wishes to persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter of character; no, on the contrary, he will apply himself above all to establish a most honourable name (δόξαν ὡς ἐπιεικεστάτην) among his fellow citizens; for who does not know that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good repute than when spoken by men who live under a cloud, and that the argument which is made by a man's life is of more weight than that which is furnished by words (ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πεπορισμένης).

This passage unquestionably refers to the contribution of the speaker's social prestige to the persuasiveness of his or her speech. And Isocrates, in this context, also uses the word δόξα. If we take this passage as additional evidence, we may confidently presume that Anaximenes in fact placed the speaker's character and reputation among 'supplementary' proofs, alongside with witnesses, tortures and oaths.⁸

With this we may finally compare what Aristotle himself has to say in Rhetoric I 2 about other people's opinions on ethos:⁹

But this confidence (created by moral character) must be due to the speech itself, not to any preconceived idea (προϋποθέσθαι) of the speaker's character; for it is not the case, as some writers of rhetorical treatises lay down in their 'Art', that the worth of the orator (τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τοῦ λέγοντος) in no way contributes to his powers of persuasion ...

⁸ In one instance (10, 1430a28) Anaximenes, too, uses the expression ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος, when mentioning discrepancies between a person's deeds and his or her character as a source of enthymemes.

⁹ Aristotle, Rhetoric I 2, 1356a8-13.

This sounds like a reply to Anaximenes and Isocrates at the same time. To describe the interpretation of *ethos* as a preconceived idea not created by *logos*, he uses the verb *προδεδοξάσθαι*, derived from *δόξα*. Furthermore, the orator's social prestige he calls *ἐπιείκεια*, just like Isocrates had spoken of the *δόξα ἐπιεικεστάτη*. Of course, Anaximenes does not say that the *δόξα τοῦ λέγοντος* contributes *nothing* to conviction, but he at least seems to have regarded it as an external, additional means of persuasion, as a given prerequisite. But in stating explicitly that orators must *demonstrate* their experience and trustworthiness to their audiences, he already paves the way for Aristotle's concept of *ethos* as technical proof.

Creating Character – Logography and Ethopoeia

That a vivid picture of the speaker's character could also be created artificially in a speech by means of language was an experience everyone in fifth and fourth century Athens was in a position to make, due to a peculiarity of the Athenian legal system. For according to Attic law, with the exception of women, who were usually represented by a tutor, any person pleading his case in court was obliged to speak for himself. Pleading by counsels or professional defenders was not allowed. But on the other hand in court almost everything, in not too few cases even life, was dependent on the skilfulness and persuasiveness of one's speech. Thus persons with poor or no rhetorical training used to turn to a well-known orator with sufficient experience in judicial matters to have their speeches written for money. They would then learn them by heart before appearing in court. For orators, this was a profitable, even if socially despised deal. In fact, most of the greatest Attic orators (like, for instance, Antiphon, Lysias, Demosthenes, Isocrates or Isaeus) at least during substantial periods of their career earned their living from logography (speech-writing) or logopoiia (speech-making), as this lucrative occupation was commonly called.

Such a made-up speech, of course, could only be made acceptable and convincing to the jury, if they could be persuaded to take it for the defendant's (or plaintiff's) own words. But naturally, a craftsman's way of speaking will be different from a merchant's, a soldier's from a farmer's, an artist's from a civil servant's, not to speak of individual differences in character. The task was thus a double one: to imitate a person's character as faithfully as possible to make the speech authentic, but at the same time to make him appear a nice, likeable and trustworthy person, whom nobody would think capable of any wrong-doing, in order to win the case.

It is evident then, that the ability to create, modulate and present any desired character in a speech by means of mere language was an important and indispensable skill for any good logographer. This art of character-drawing in a speech written in the mask of another person was called *ethopoiía* (or: character-making), and was later to become a famous school

exercise.¹⁰ But by the fourth century B.C.E. already, Attic orators had developed this skill almost to perfection. Especially Lysias is often praised for his versatility in imitating any defendant's character in speech.¹¹ Orators even made use of this technique for epideictic purposes. Famous examples of such artful ethopoeiae are Isocrates' *Archidamus* (Or. 6) and *Nicoles* (Or. 3).

It is not unreasonable to believe that the common practice of logography, too, contributed to the development of the idea of ethos as a technical means of persuasion. Exactly because it was common practice, a philosopher like Aristotle may have felt the need to make sure that it was responsibly controlled by logos.

Getting Technical : Aristotle on Ethos

Like his teacher Plato, Aristotle puts rhetoric under the primacy of moral philosophy. He wants it to be an art, a *téchne*,¹² which, according to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, means: a productive habit (πολιτική ἐξις) combined with reason.¹³ From this point of view, within the realm of rhetoric, too, for him all activities associated with producing (ποιεῖν), providing (κατασκευάζειν, πορίζειν) or finding or inventing (εὐρίσκειν) hold a higher rank than those that involve mere usage (χρῆν) of something. Consequently, among means of persuasion, he assigns greater value to those produced or invented by the orator's own skill and imagination than to those provided by external circumstances, of which the orator only makes use. This is the theoretical basis of Aristotle's distinction between technical and non-technical proofs.¹⁴ Technical proofs he also calls "proofs furnished by the speech" (πίστεις διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζόμεναι).¹⁵ He thus inverts the evaluation given by Isocrates in the passage quoted above. While Isocrates devaluates proofs only furnished "by words" over against the speaker's social standing, Aristotle makes right these the nobler class, but on the other hand he incorporates the speaker's character into this group, too. And, if our interpretation of the passages in Anaximenes and Isocrates was correct, he might have been the first one to do so.

Technical proofs, for Aristotle, are three in number: ethos, pathos, and logos, or, as he himself puts it (*Rhetoric* I 2, 1356a2-4):

The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker (ἐν τῷ ᾧ ἔχει τοῦ λέγοντος), the second upon putting the hearer into a certain frame of mind (ἐν τῷ

¹⁰ Hans-Martin Hagen, *Hētopoia. Zur Geschichte eines rhetorischen Begriffs* (Diss. Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1966).

¹¹ See William L. Devries, *Ethopoiia: A Rhetorical Study of the Types of Character in the Orations of Lysias*, (Diss. Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 1892).

¹² Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 2, 1355b325-34.

¹³ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VI 4, 1140a10.

¹⁴ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 2, 1355b35-39.

¹⁵ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 2, 1356a1.

τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πως), the third upon the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove.

Thus in Aristotle, the three technical proofs are neatly distributed among the three main factors involved in linguistic communication: Ethos clearly is associated with the speaker, while pathos aims at the hearer's mind, and rational argumentation goes with the speech itself. His description of the functioning of ethos, however, sounds rather like in his predecessors (Rhetoric I 2, 1356a4-8):

The orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence (ἀξιόπιστον); for we feel confidence in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth in regard to everything in general, but where there is no certainty, but there is room for doubt, our confidence is absolute.

But Aristotle not only makes ethos one of the technical means of persuasion, he even calls it "so to speak, almost the most effective one" (σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην).¹⁶ This is quite surprising. One would probably not have expected him to assign this predicate to ethos, given the powerful psychagogic effects of pathos and the central role of logos for Aristotle. How can ethos on the one hand be created by logos, and at the same time be more powerful than logos? A possible solution is that this happens by virtue of its being a function of logos.¹⁷

But how is this mechanism supposed to work? Unfortunately, as for ethos, while he boldly announces it as the most powerful proof, Aristotle is quite reticent on details. At least he informs us that "independently of demonstration, the things which make the speaker himself trustworthy, are three in number. These qualities are prudence (φρόνησις), virtue (ἀρετή), and good will (εὐνοία)."¹⁸ Here emerges an important difference between Aristotle's concepts of ethos in the *Ethics* and in the *Rhetoric*; for in the *Nicomachean Ethics* ethos is confined to the so-called ethical virtues and excludes the so-called dianoetical ones. But here in the *Rhetoric*, a dianoetical virtue like phronesis is included in the concept of ethos.¹⁹

In two passages in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle states that, to make himself appear trustworthy and virtuous, the orator will employ the same methods as he would in the case of others.²⁰ It is here that Aristotle comes closest to making use of the logographers' ethopoietical skills as we

¹⁶ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 2, 1356a13.

¹⁷ See Eugene Garver, "ἦθος and Argument: the ἦθος of the Speaker and the ἦθος of the Audience", *Papers on Rhetoric III* (ed. Lucia Calboli Montefusco, Bologna: CLUEB, 2000) 113.

¹⁸ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II 1, 1378a6-8; cf. I 8, 1366a11-12; see Süß, *Ethos*, 149. It is noteworthy that Aristotle consequently avoids using the word ἦθος in *Rhetoric* II 1, but uses a number of paraphrases; see William W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's Accounts of Persuasion through Character", *Theory, Text, Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory* (ed. Christopher L. Johnstone, Albany, NY: SUNY, 1996), 151.

¹⁹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I 13, 1103a3-10; see Eckart Schütrumpf, *Die Bedeutung des Wortes ethos in der Poetik des Aristoteles* (München: C.H. Beck, 1970), 23-25; 28-34.

²⁰ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 9, 1366a27-28; II 1, 1378a15-18.

described them above. The character created by speech, of course, is not a mimetic image or copy of the person's real character, but an *autonomos* product of *logos*.²¹

To be able to create his or her own character, the speaker will have to turn to the *ethos* of the audience, which is highly important for him or her to know.²² For any audience will of course be pleased to hear *logoi* appropriate to their own character.²³ The speaker, however will not imitate directly the *ethos* of the audience, but out of their *ethos* he will make arguments which will in turn generate his or her own *ethos*.

This mechanism can only be explained with reference to Aristotle's theory of actions. According to him actions spring either from ethical choices (*προαιρέσεις*) or from rational reasoning (*διάνοια*). A person's *ethos* itself is only recognizable to others by inference from his or her choices; choices, however, in their turn can only be judged from the person's actions and speeches. The same applies to dramatic characters in the *Poetics* (15, 1454a17-19):

The play will show character if [...] either the dialogue (*λόγος*) or the actions (*πρᾶξεις*) reveal some choice (*προαίρεσίν τινα*), and the character will be good, if the choice is good.

Likewise, in the *Rhetoric* *ethē* are made apparent by their *prohairesēis*, which in turn are revealed by appropriate speeches and actions. This is the way the speaker values the audience's *ethos*, as well as the audience guesses to the speaker's, thus making *ethos* as a technical means of persuasion possible.²⁴ The kind of inference necessary in this process may be identified with the type of enthymemes from signs Aristotle describes in the *Rhetoric* and the *Prior Analytics*.²⁵ This method will work for prudence and virtue, which are more closely related to speech, while for good will an appeal to *pathos* in the audience will be necessary.²⁶ This may refer to III 12-17, where some standard types of *ethos* are listed with reference to their respective emotions and moral habits, much in the sense of the *Ethics*.²⁷

Shifting Paradigms: Cicero and Quintilian

What exactly happened to Aristotle's neatly arranged system of rhetorical proofs during the nearly three centuries between his *Rhetoric* and the earliest documents of Roman rhetoric is difficult to tell, due to lack of sources. In a way, it seems to have fallen into decay, the once

²¹ See e.g. Eckart Schütrumpf, "Non-Logical Means of Persuasion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Cicero's *De oratore*", *Peripatetic Rhetoric After Aristotle* (eds. W.W. Fortenbaugh and David Mirhady, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 6, New Brunswick, N.J./London 1994) 97.

²² Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 8, 1365b22-25, 1366a8-16; II 18, 1391b19-26. See Garver, "Ἠθος", 114-124.

²³ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II 13, 1390a25; cf. 1366a13; Plato, *Gorgias* 513b8.

²⁴ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 8, 1366a15, cf. II 21, 1395a22-33.

²⁵ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 2, 1357b1-25; *Prior Analytics* II 27, 70a2-38.

²⁶ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II 1, 1378a18-19. See Garver, "Ἠθος", 122-124.

²⁷ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* III 12-17, 1388b31-1391b6; cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* II 5, 1106b24-27; VI 13, 1145a4-5).

clear-cut lines of demarcation between individual elements getting increasingly blurred. Peripatetic interest in ethos seems to have shifted from rhetorical to more literary spheres, as Theophrastus' *Characters* demonstrate.

In Roman rhetoric, the question of ethos develops in two different directions. Two different questions may be asked: First: What takes the functional place of ethos within the rhetorical system? And second: What becomes of the term ethos itself?

The first question is easier to answer. Certainly, one functional remainder of Aristotle's ethos in Roman technical handbooks is the famous triad of *attentum, docilem, benevolum parare auditorem*, now reduced to a dry topics of motifs for constructing a proem, placed under the head of *inventio*.²⁸ It is noteworthy, too, that the whole question, although rooted in Aristotle's ethos, is now clearly audience oriented.

Furthermore, the question of how to create an appropriate image of a convincing character by rhetorical means in the Roman context is more and more overlaid by the different question of the quest for the ideal orator, in a way returning to pre-Aristotelian, rather Isocratean views. For the ideal orator, for the Romans, is regarded as "the good man experienced in speaking" (*vir bonus dicendi peritus*), as the Elder Cato is said to have defined him,²⁹ with a clear stress on the "good man". Just as for Plato only the philosopher was the ideal orator,³⁰ for the Romans it is the morally impeccable and universally educated man.³¹

There may be some Platonic or Stoic moralizing in that definition, but there is also a social background. The Roman upper class well into the first century B.C.E. showed a certain hostility to the technical rhetoric of the Greeks. A decent Roman *iuvenis* acquired his eloquence neither from handbooks nor from rhetors' classes, but from the sanctified institution of the *tirocinium fori*, the apprenticeship of the young man with an experienced politician and orator. Cicero himself as a young man witnessed the ban put on the so-called *rhetores Latini* (a group of Roman rhetors who adopted Greek technical oratory and translated it into Latin) by L. Crassus the censor, right the man who was later to play a central part in Cicero's dialogue *De oratore*.³² His own father even forbade him to attend those rhetors' classes.³³

The Romans thus seem to have stressed that the ideal orator should really possess certain characteristics and virtues instead of only making the appearance of possessing them. But, on the other hand, Cicero's speeches on his own behalf are in fact very typical cases of creating and depicting one's own character at will (a fact which would suggest further investigations

²⁸ Cf. *Rhetorica ad Herennium* I 4, 6-8; Cicero, *De inventione* I 15, 20-16, 22; *De partitionibus oratoris* 8, 28; Quintilian IV 1, 5, 5-39.

²⁹ Quintilian XII 1, 1; cf. II 16, 11; 17, 31; Seneca maior, *Controversiae* I, praef. 9.

³⁰ Plato, *Phaedrus* 270a-274a.

³¹ See W.L. Grant, "Vir bonus", *Classical Journal*, 38 (1941-42) 472-478.

³² Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 25, 1; Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* XV, 11; cf. Cicero, *De oratore* III 24, 93-95; see Peter L. Schmidt, "Die Anfänge der institutionellen Rhetorik in Rom. Zur Vorgeschichte der augusteischen Rhetorenschulen", *Monumentum Chiloniense. Festschrift für E. Burck* (ed. Eckard Lefèvre, Amsterdam, 1975), 183-216.

leading into the subtleties of the nowadays fashionable question of definition of authorship). At least Cicero, then, was open to both concepts.

But what about the second question? What became of *ethos* itself? From Cicero onwards, it was regularly coupled with and considered complementary to one of its fellow technical proofs, namely *pathos*. Cicero, in *De oratore* and *Orator*, in principle treats *ethos* and *pathos* as distinct features. *Ethos* is associated with the rhetorical aim of putting into a favourable mood (*conciliare*) and placed into the proem,³⁴ while *pathos* is associated with moving (*movere, flectere*) and located in the epilogue.³⁵ But, almost imperceptibly, borders get blurred. For Cicero in some passages in the *Orator* distinguishes between more vehement emotions (*adfectus duriores*) like anger, envy, hate or fear, regarded appropriate for arousing passions in the accusation, and gentler ones (*adfectus mitiores*) like favour, love, joy and pity, suitable for soothing passions in the defence.³⁶ This distinction replaced the older one of the arousal of aggressive, indignant passions (in accusation) and the inducing of pitiful passions (in defence).³⁷ But ultimately, this confusion already perceptible in Cicero gradually led to the identification of *ethos* with the gentler emotions, and of *pathos* with the more vehement emotions. *Ethos* was consequently subsumed under *pathos*, and what remained was only a difference in degree between *ethos* and *pathos*.

This final step was taken by Quintilian, as is evident from the following passage from book VI of his *Institutio oratoria* (VI 2, 8-10):

Emotions, however, as we learn from ancient authorities, fall into two classes; the one is called *pathos* by the Greeks and is rightly and correctly expressed in Latin by *adfectus* (emotion): the other is called *ethos*, a word for which in my opinion Latin has no equivalent: it is however rendered by *mores* (character) and consequently the branch of philosophy known as ethics is styled moral philosophy by us. [...] The more cautious writers have preferred to give the sense of the term rather than to translate it into Latin. They therefore explain *pathos* as describing the more violent emotions and *ethos* as designating those which are calm and gentle: in the one case the passions are violent, in the other subdued, the former command and disturb, the latter persuade and induce a feeling of goodwill. Some add that *ethos* is continuous, while *pathos* is momentary.

In Quintilian, then, *ethos* has changed sides to the enemy's camp and has become just a gentler and more stable form of *pathos*. But it has changed sides in another way, too. From an

³³ Suetonius, *De grammaticis et rhetoribus* 26, 1.

³⁴ Cicero, *De oratore* II 42, 178-43, 184.

³⁵ Cicero, *De oratore* II 44, 185-53, 216.

³⁶ Cicero, *Orator* 37, 128-38, 131; cf. *De oratore* II 78, 315-80, 325.

³⁷ See Ludwig Voit, *Δεινότης, ein antiker Stilbegriff* (Leipzig, 1934) 137-138.

efficient means of persuasion solely associated with the speaker, it has become a form of emotion to be induced in the minds of the audience.³⁸

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³⁸ Cf. Quintilian VI 2, 12; see Fortenbaugh, "Quintilian 6.2.8-9: Ethos and Pathos and the Ancient Tradition", *Peripatetic Rhetoric After Aristotle* (W.W.F., David Mirhady (ed.), Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 6, New Brunswick, N.J./London 1994) 183-191; Voit, *Δεινότης*, 138-140.