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Cicero Latinizes Hellenic *Ethos*

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"My whole [method] of oratory and that very ability in speaking, which Crassus just now elevated to heaven with his words, has three systems, as I said before: one, the securing of men's goodwill; the second, enlightening them; the third, in exciting their passion."

—Antonius in Cicero's *De Oratore* 2.128

"And I also recall . . . when my opinions held great weight in the Senate."

—Cicero to Lentulus, *Epistulae ad Familiares* 1.9.12

TWO topics dominate scholarship on *ethos* in classical rhetoric: Aristotelian theory and Ciceronian practice. That is, scholarly commentary on the role of *ethos* in classical rhetoric typically stresses Aristotle's theoretical definition of *ethos* or Cicero's demonstration of *ethos* through his public oratory. The tendency to associate Aristotle with theory and Cicero with practice, though providing important insights, overlooks the possibility that Cicero's effective practice has a strong counterpart in his distinctive contributions to the theory of *ethos*.

The theoretical treatment of *ethos* is firmly and centrally situated in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as one of three main proofs warranting the *thesis*, or judgment, of an opinion. Aristotle's discussion clearly accounts for the audience's preexisting views of the rhetor; these can be imported into the rhetorical act and thus have the status of

an atechnic (inartistic) proof. Yet much of his attention in the *Rhetoric* is directed toward the creation of entechnic (artistic) proof and toward the creation of ethical proof that takes place within the act of discourse and between rhetor and audience. So explicit is Aristotle's discussion of this process that references and sections of his treatment of *ethos* are readily identifiable within his *Rhetoric*, which, in part, explains the considerable amount of scholarship.

In contrast to the scholarship on the theoretical treatment of Aristotelian *ethos*, studies emphasizing the practical application of *ethos* frequently examine Cicero's legal and political speeches. Such work provides important observations that help to explain how *ethos* is culturally created between rhetor and audience within a specific social context. Although the study of *ethos* as either Aristotelian theory or Ciceronian practice is valuable, a third potential source of study receives little attention: Cicero's theoretical views on *ethos*. Our essay seeks to complement earlier work that stresses Ciceronian *ethos* as practiced in oratory with a more sensitive understanding of the meaning of *ethos* in his rhetorical theory.

The lack of attention to Ciceronian theory on *ethos* may be related to the accessibility of evidence. Unlike Aristotle, Cicero did not define *ethos* in clearly labeled and extractable passages. Cicero's Latinized notion of *ethos*—while just as important and central to his rhetorical theory as is Aristotle's—is much more difficult to identify and understand. In fact, the term *ethos* is rarely used by Cicero; it is documented in only one instance in all of his *Rhetorica* (*Orator* 128; Abott et al. 438).¹ Quintilian believed that *ethos* had no Latin synonym (*Institutio oratoria* 6.2.8–9; cf. May 4).² The absence of the term *ethos* itself should not, however, lead to the conclusion that an understanding of *ethos* is not present in Cicero's works. Passages and references that bear on his views of *ethos* occur throughout his writings. Reconstructing Cicero's notion of *ethos* therefore requires a careful synthesis of references culled from a range of works.

A second reason for the concentration on Cicero's application of *ethos* is the uniqueness and abundance of the record of his public oratory. Cicero was the first *novus homo* to be elected consul in

thirty years (Syme 94), and as the unprecedented success of his legal victories reveals, his career is a testimonial to how the force of character through effective rhetoric could be a source of persuasion in the Roman Republic. So extraordinary was Cicero's success that the focus for understanding Ciceronian *ethos* has centered on his political and legal speeches as well as the fascinating interplay between his performance as an orator and his post-performance as a writer in the "publication" of orations (Enos, *Literate Mode*). Yet, Cicero's reputation as a statesman and advocate is complemented (and in some instances outdistanced) by his contributions as a theoretician of rhetoric. Just as it is important to understand Ciceronian *ethos* in order to understand his political and legal career, so also is his notion of *ethos* central to understanding his rhetorical theory.

Ciceronian *ethos* is actually a confluence of notions, a synthesis of several concepts that interact in different ways. No single, corresponding Latin expression—for example, *persona* (*De Oratore* 3.54) or *auctoritas*, (*De Senectute* 17)—has a meaning equivalent to *ethos*, and the search for such a term misdirects our understanding of the complexity of the concept. Thus, to avoid promoting a particular Latin term that would only create an error of labeling and category, the Greek term *ethos* is used throughout this essay with intent. Its use is meant to convey the confluence of Ciceronian Latin concepts that, taken together, form his notion of *ethos*.

In addition to synthesizing Cicero's notion of *ethos*, this chapter has a perspective markedly different from that found in current scholarship. As mentioned above, much of the research on Ciceronian *ethos* concentrates on his performance, his enactment of *ethos* through public oratory, with scarcely any discussion of *ethos* based on his theoretical works. Scholars have sought to understand Cicero's impact by accounting for the ways in which he utilized discourse to create a forceful character in the Roman courts and political arena, often concentrating on the notion of the portrayal and creation of a *vir bonus* image (Enos and McClaran; Cherry). George Kennedy's discussion of *ethos* with respect to Cicero is one of the best illustrations of such a perspec-

tive. Kennedy uses the term *ethos* throughout his *Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* but principally discusses *ethos* in terms of Roman oratory (e.g. 100). Kennedy's discussion of Cicero's theoretical treatment of *ethos* is concentrated in one paragraph (222–23) in which he advances only the briefest explanation and one limited to a few comments that Cicero made in *De Oratore*. In this section Kennedy claims that Cicero shared Aristotle's view that *ethos* is a major constituent of rhetoric, but Kennedy recognizes that Cicero's "actual treatment is not particularly Aristotelian" (222). Kennedy considers Cicero's account of *ethos* "brief" but "striking" because "Cicero regards *ethos* as consisting in presentation of the gentler emotions" (222). "It conciliates and charms the audience," Kennedy asserts, "and is essentially good natured, a lower level of dramatic intensity than the raging fire of *pathos* which is the real triumph of the speaker's art" (222).

Kennedy's account of Cicero's theoretical views of *ethos* should arouse some degree of caution. First, despite the fact that Kennedy recognizes a fundamental difference between Cicero's notion of *ethos* and Aristotle's, he nonetheless defines Ciceronian *ethos* by Aristotelian standards. Second, Kennedy limits his interpretation of Ciceronian *ethos* to two passages in Book II of *De Oratore* (i.e., 2.182–83, 212). Yet the importance of *ethos*, discussed through various terms by Cicero, is treated not only in other sections of *De Oratore* but also throughout several other rhetorical and philosophical works. Third, Kennedy's interpretation, based largely on passage 2.182–83 in *De Oratore*, sees *ethos* only in terms of a continuum with *pathos* (e.g., *Rhetoric* 41, 505). That is, Kennedy believes that *ethos* and *pathos* are different not in kind but only in the degree of emotion, a view that he may have derived from Quintilian (6.2.8–9) and erroneously attributed to Cicero (see Grimaldi, "Auditors' Role" 74–77). Our examination, however, illustrates that while emotion has a place in his theory, Ciceronian *ethos* is a phenomenon markedly different from the conception of "*ethos* as consisting in the presentation of gentler emotions," as Kennedy claims (*Rhetoric* 222).

Scholarship subsequent to Kennedy's *Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* has advanced the contributions made by Kennedy

but has done so with a manner and focus different from the objectives of this chapter. One of the best, and most recent, illustrations of such a study is James M. May's *Trials of Character: The Eloquence of Ciceronian Ethos*. May's detailed and careful study of *ethos* concentrates on Cicero's demonstration of character as revealed in his legal and political speeches. In fact, in his "Preface," May explicitly characterizes his book as intending "to meet the need for a closer examination of *ethos* ('character') as it was used by Roman orators, particularly Cicero" (vii). May's brief introductory discussion of the theoretical treatment of *ethos* is heavily dependent on Aristotle and a compilation of various Roman sources that draw from some observations of Cicero. May's statement of *ethos*, however, neither intends nor provides a coherent synthesis from Cicero's rhetorical theory but rather concentrates on his demonstration of *ethos* as an orator.

Elaine Fantham's excellent essay, "Ciceronian *Conciliare* and Aristotelian *Ethos*," provides a thorough theoretical comparison of Cicero's use of the term *conciliare* (the securing of good will) with Aristotle's treatment of *ethos*. In her meticulous explication of the similarity and differences of these two terms, Fantham notes that difficulties arise when one seeks to match comparative Greek and Roman terms on a one-to-one basis. Even as Fantham explicates the meaning of *conciliare* (e.g., *De Oratore* 2.115, 128), she recognizes its limitations.³ Fantham notes, for example, that Cicero used "the verb *conciliare* when he chose it to represent the Aristotelian use of *Ethos*" but did so only once "after *De Oratore*" in a similar connection (273 and n. 11), and she even indicates that other possible terms could capture some of the dimensions of *ethos* as characterized by Aristotle. One of the presuppositions driving the work of Fantham and others (for example, Fortenbaugh, "*Benevolentiam conciliare*") is that the route to understanding Cicero's theoretical views of *ethos* is through the term *conciliare*, despite the fact that significant differences between the treatments of Aristotle and Cicero are noted. William M. A. Grimaldi discusses the problems of Fantham's characterization of Aristotelian *ethos* as being on a continuum of emotions ("Auditors' Role" 80 n.16), particularly since Aristotle is so clear on the dis-

tinctions between *ethos* and *pathos* ("Auditors' Role" 69). Fortenbaugh posits the possibility that "Cicero's account of *ethos* in *De Oratore* is not so much drawing out what is implicit in Aristotle as developing a significantly different notion of the orator's use of *ethos*" (Review 506). Our efforts concentrate not on *conciliare* but rather on the features of *ethos* that produce the securing of approval through character made possible by rhetoric. Paul Prill indirectly reveals this point when discussing Cicero's views on securing good will in the *Orator*. Prill cites *Orator* 128, in which Cicero provides his views on the Greek notion of *ethos* as aspiring to be agreeable and courteous in order to secure good will (95). It should be noted that being "courteous" and "agreeable" so that one can "win goodwill" is not a trait of *ethos* but its result; that is, such descriptors are the audience's impressions of the rhetor's appearance, their sentiments of admiration, and are not the traits themselves (*Orator* 128; *De Oratore* 2.184). *Conciliare* does (of course) mean good will, but it is the consequence of creating *ethos* within rhetorical discourse and is not the constituent trait that Cicero discusses throughout his theoretical works. Thus, while there will be a conspicuous absence of the discussion of *conciliare* in this chapter, the implications of observations for earlier work dealing with *conciliare* should become evident.

In short, scholarship on Ciceronian *ethos* has been dominated by two approaches: first, an emphasis on Ciceronian *ethos* as manifested in his political career; and second, comparative treatments of Aristotle's concept of *ethos* with Cicero's use of the term *conciliare*. Neither approach provides a sufficient view of Cicero's theoretical notions of *ethos*. Further, this chapter does not discuss the *vir bonus* image, which has already been examined (Enos and McClaran) and which emphasizes appearance rather than our concern here for the theoretical constituents of Ciceronian *ethos*. Our perspective is concerned with Cicero's theoretical meaning of *ethos*. Rather than focus on a single Latin term such as *conciliare*, however, we seek to understand Ciceronian *ethos* through a synthesis of critical concepts and their relationships. Cicero wrote about the source and force of character widely and frequently in his works, describing traits, features, and benefits to such an

extent, with such a variety of terms, and with such complexity that the task of synthesizing his views has not been undertaken. Few, however, would doubt the merits of attempting such an enterprise (Kennedy, *Rhetoric* 150–51; Clarke 50–61). Understanding Cicero's complex notion of *ethos* as discussed throughout his theoretical works would not only help ground his views on rhetoric but also provide a perspective for viewing his practice as a rhetor.

The Traits of Ciceronian *Ethos* and Their Constituent Elements

Reconstructing the notion of Ciceronian *ethos* requires understanding the relationships among several factors. First, the concept of Ciceronian *ethos* includes three essential traits of character: *ingenium* (also termed *natura*), *prudentia*, and *diligentia*. Cicero firmly believed that every great rhetor earned his reputation by manifesting *ingenium*, or *natura*, a natural capacity for eloquence (*De Oratore* 1.146).⁴ In fact, Cicero believed that the natural capacity for lucid discourse was not the product of rhetoric's art but was instead its essence (*De Oratore* 1.146). "For swiftness of spirit and talent [*ingenium*] ought to be engaged," wrote Cicero through Crassus, "namely acuteness in thorough consideration, copiousness in explication and adornment, and a firmness and durability in memory. . . . And it is a mistake to think that these [traits] can be acquired by art" (*De Oratore* 1.113–14). Antonius also emphasizes the importance of possessing such qualities for success or, lacking such gifts, possessing at least their appearance. At all costs, Antonius argues, one must give the appearance of natural ability and avoid the suspicion that one has studied techniques (*De Oratore* 2.152, 153). In short, Cicero had both of his primary spokespersons in *De Oratore* emphasize the importance of natural talent, but for different reasons. For Crassus (and Catulus), natural talent (3.82–86) was an essential character trait that was the prerequisite for eloquence. For Antonius, *ingenium* or *natura* was a trait that must be made apparent to the audience because the realization (or appearance) of natural ability was itself a force in rhetoric. One's demonstration of natural ability through

wit, for example, would be an enormous benefit in revealing natural capacity to an audience as well as ridiculing the character of others (*De Oratore* 2.230–32, 288–89; *Brutus* 322; *De Amicitia* 66). Similarly, while it is impossible to read Cicero's theoretical works and not realize the importance of a copious education as a prerequisite for the full utilization of rhetoric's art (e.g., *Brutus* 253; *De Oratore* 3.54), it is equally impossible not to recognize that such a fullness must be grounded in one's natural ability and that such ability must be made apparent to the audience through the discourse. Cicero believed that both the attaining and the expressing of thought together constituted *sapientia*, or wisdom (*De Oratore* 3.56), a trait normally acquired over time and through experience (*De Senectute* 17). In short, a continued development and demonstration of *ingenium* or *natura* would result in a public's recognition of the rhetor's *sapientia*. This sort of long-term, cumulative effect of *ethos* is central to understanding and appreciating not only Cicero's views on the social dynamism of creating *ethos* but also its diachronic development. Rhetoric could "create" *ethos* at the moment of discourse and its effect could transcend the event and remain as either a residual force or a detriment for the rhetor long after the situation.

Complementing the manifestation of natural talent is the trait of *prudentia*. Sagacity to adapt and modify rhetorical discourse to the context of the situation was a trait that others, such as Brutus (*Epistulae ad Brutum* 11) and Quintilian (6.5.9–11), praised in Cicero, who manifested it throughout his legal career (Enos, *Literate Mode*). Since Cicero firmly believed that judging the validity of rhetorical discourse rested with the audience (*Tusculanae Disputationes* 2.3; *Brutus* 183–84; *Orator* 24; *De Oratore* 3.91), a rhetor's ability to adapt his discourse to any situation (*De Oratore* 2.337) became a necessary trait, one that could be manifested in a variety of ways. For example, the demonstration of propriety was strongly related to the manifestation of *dignitas*, which was not only perceived but also determined by the audience. Cicero believed that manifesting propriety through rhetoric enhanced one's dignity to listeners (*De Officiis* 1.137).

Cicero further believed that *prudentia* was exhibited and cre-

ated in discourse through a demonstration of virtue, particularly if grounded in a serious study of ethics (Enos, *Literate Mode*); in fact, he even asserted that no virtue was possible without it (*Tusculanae Disputationes* 5.14). Thus, Cicero believed that a rhetor must demonstrate a prudent character, one that recognizes the nature of a situation, the essence of the ethical dispute, and ways of manifesting such views to the audience. Although responding to expediency was essential in Roman rhetoric, Cicero believed that "nothing is expedient that is not also honest" (*De Officiis* 3.30). For Cicero, the concepts of virtue and *dignitas* are manifestations of values. Thus, it is perfectly clear how Roman audiences would take what a rhetor states as a manifestation of the essence of his character (*De Oratore* 2.184); audiences would likely infer that what a rhetor argued in any cause was an index of his personal conviction and therefore his character. The persistent articulation of values and the advocacy of a "proper" course of action are acts of discourse that emanate from a rhetor and encourage an audience to view such pronouncements as the statement of a moral code appropriate to the situation. The audience, in turn, would likely have made an impression of the rhetor's character, an impression that would become a force in the discourse. *Ethos*, then, is not only *ingenium*, the appearance and demonstration of innate gifts appropriate to the situation, but also *prudentia*, which enables a rhetor to convey to an audience the moral issues at stake and the need to adhere to the cause he is championing. Through *prudentia*, the meaning of justice inherent in the solution could be made apparent to those listeners or readers who ultimately determined the merit and moral worth of a position (cf. *De Finibus* 5.65–69).

On occasion, however, the manifestation of character comes not only from what is argued but from the age and experience of the individual. Cicero clearly believed that old age was itself a great advantage in character and judgment (*De Senectute* 17). In this respect, Cicero's views parallel those of Lysias (Kennedy, *Persuasion*, 135–36), who saw in *ethopoiia* the distinct advantage of so composing a piece of discourse that it manifests those traits of character appropriate to the individual giving the address (cf.

Rhetorica ad Herennium 4.63–66). The manifestation of *prudētia*, though most commonly associated with the force and character of judgment in elders, was nonetheless a force in persuasion and one that Cicero recognized as important to the concept of *ethos*.

Cicero believed that *ingenium* and *prudētia* were essential traits for a rhetor. He also believed that a rhetor must have passion of commitment (e.g. *diligentia*) and must make such fervor apparent to the audience (*De Oratore* 2.182). As in Aristotle's *Rhetorica*, emotions are a critical, inescapable feature of Cicero's rhetoric (*De Oratore* 2.197–216). In this instance, Cicero's views on persuasion are akin to Aristotle's notion of *energeia*, or "actualizing"—that is, the creative performance or setting into motion of such character traits (Grimaldi, *Commentary* 5). Natural ability and wisdom, unaccompanied by feeling, or *adfectus* (see also Quintilian 6.2.8–9), had little hope of capturing or even engaging an audience. Cicero believed that the exhibition of such emotion revealed a spirit deeply moved by conviction (*De Divinatione* 1.80), in short, the demonstration of an individual willing to act on ethical principles for the sake of justice. In this respect, the arousal of passion in the audience bonds the rhetor with the audience since the sense of commitment, urgency, and importance is one that the rhetor seeks to share with others.

Emotive traits also provided an index of one's commitment to a cause. Intense commitment, often referred to by such terms as *industria*, *diligentia*, and *labor*, described an energized rhetor and indirectly, his audience (e.g. *Epistulae ad Familiares* 10.28). As Cicero's remarks in *De Oratore* capture this sentiment when he tells Catulus, "Nor then do I admire less your eloquence and magnify your great virtue and diligence and at the same time I delight to have the opinion of my own feelings made good, which attitude I have always had, that no one is able to attain praise for wisdom and eloquence without the utmost zeal, labor and education" (2.362–363; see also 148–51). It is the wedding of passion and industry that reveals a rhetor's sense of *officium*, or duty. *Officium* is the element of conviction (*De Oratore* 3.118) and is the very theme of Cicero's treatise *De Officiis*. Such qualities—the intensity of

passion for a cause, and the industry and zeal in pursuing one's sentiments—are captured in the concept of *officium*. The demonstration of these qualities reveals the rhetor's *diligentia*, which is the synthesis of his passion, industry, and sense of duty.

The Manifestation and Benefits of Ciceronian *Ethos*


Ingenium, *prudētia*, and *diligentia* are the triumvirate of character traits of Ciceronian *ethos*; together they constitute his notion of *dignitas*. In the opening lines of *De Oratore*, when Cicero announced that he would abandon his political career and devote his time to intellectual pursuits, he spoke of the desire to have "otio cum dignitate" (1.1), that is, the sort of leisure time one could enjoy after a career of service in the courts and Senate. Within an act of discourse, Cicero felt that *dignitas* was important in every aspect of rhetoric (*De Oratore* 2.333–34), for it was a standard that went beyond meeting the immediate expectations of an audience to meeting those ideals that appealed to Romans as a community. In essence, *dignitas* was a notion that shaped the direction of rhetoric to appeal not only to the expediency of the moment but also to the larger, indirect audience that served as the judge of the ultimate validity of his rhetoric: the communal standards. In this respect, Cicero's notion of *dignitas* reveals his view of *ethos*, that the composition of rhetoric must meet not only the standards of an immediate audience but the social standards of Rome as a community and a culture. Cicero believed that such a perspective was a natural result of training in rhetoric (*De Oratore* 3.177–78) or the result of the unity of *ingenium*, *prudētia*, and *diligentia*. Cicero's private correspondence amply supports both his anxiety to please particular audiences and his joy at doing so without compromising his dignity (*Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem* 2.3; *Epistulae ad Familiares* 1.7.10; *Epistulae ad Atticum* 2.19), that is, the standards he held for himself and for the larger community that existed beyond the particulars of the situations in which he was involved.

The constituent traits of *ethos* discussed to this point have been concerned with how *ethos* is developed within discourse, that is,

how a rhetor can facilitate the creation of *ethos* by the demonstration of specific traits. An audience's recognition and acceptance of such traits would, in turn, prompt them to view the rhetor as manifesting *dignitas*. The important point, however, is that such traits are developed within the discourse and are thus *ethos-as-created* proof having the characteristics of entechnic proof. Cicero's rhetorical works develop this point by discussing the relationship of *ethos* within arrangement (Enos, "Ciceronian *Dispositio*"). There are, within a rhetorical composition, specific divisions in which certain points and material are to be stressed and certain qualities of the rhetor to be directly or indirectly underscored. The *exordium*, for example, not only is the point where a rhetor seeks to either subdue a hostile audience or, under normal conditions, win their good will (*De Inventione* 1.19–26; Prill 94) but also is an opportunity to marshal arguments that will deal with the disposition of the audience in a manner that manifests *prudentia*. In a similar respect, during the *narratio*, the rhetor can provide an exposition of critical events (*De Inventione* 1.27–30) in a manner that "creates" the image of one's ethics and honesty (*prudentia*) as well as one's industry and duty (*diligentia*). Cicero even underscores the importance of *digressio* (*De Inventione* 1.97) as an opportunity to depart from the conventional pattern of arrangement, if prudent, to amplify a tangential yet persuasive point. It was not uncommon for Cicero to actually use such a division of rhetoric to concentrate on *ethos*, that is, to highlight some point of character associated with his own position or that of his clients or, conversely, to denigrate the character and motives of the opponent on a point not at issue but damaging to the audience's perception of an opposing character (Enos, *Literate Mode*). A reading of Cicero's discussion of invention will reveal that the creation of proofs in these and the other divisions of a composition provides the opportunity not only to create good reasons or excite emotions but also to create character for the client or rhetor. It is clear that the expectations of proof are localized for Cicero, based on the expectations of the various points of arrangement (Enos, "Ciceronian *Dispositio*"). In that sense, invention is localized through arrangement. This phenomenon applies not only to the

making of good reasons but also to the creation of the rhetor's *ethos*, since different divisions within the discourse, such as the two illustrations provided above, are more appropriately identified with specific traits. Thus the cocreation of ethical proof, like the cocreation of rational and emotive proof, is not only invented within the discourse but localized through and identified as appropriate by the presumptions, shared between rhetor and audience, of the specific divisions of the composition.

The successful manifestation of a rhetor's *dignitas* within an act of rhetoric was the result of an audience's recognition and acceptance of traits captured under and respectfully defining *ingenium*, *prudentia*, and *diligentia*. Yet, the impact of Ciceronian *ethos* had meaning beyond the immediate context of the rhetorical situation, for the successful demonstration of *diligentia* within an act of rhetoric had benefits beyond the event. These benefits fall into three primary areas: *auctoritas*, *honor*, and *gloria*. Cicero believed that a lifetime demonstration of *dignitas* would enable a rhetor to attain *auctoritas*, which he considered to be "the height of old age" (*De Senectute* 61). While a sustained, public reputation was a necessity for *auctoritas*, "neither grey hairs nor wrinkles," Cicero asserted, "are suddenly able to seize *auctoritas*, but the greatest *auctoritas* is honestly earned as the consequence of a life of superior public deeds" (*De Senectute* 62–63). Coexisting with *auctoritas* was public *honor* (*De Senectute* 61) and with that recognition, *gloria* (*De Republica* 6.20). Such recognition, Cicero believed, came as a consequence of *virtus*, *dignitas*, and *nobilitas* (*Librorum De Re Publica Incertorum Fragmenta* 5; *De Officiis* 1.14) and was bestowed on an individual by an appreciative society (*Tusculanae Disputationes* 1.112). As Crassus observed in *De Oratore* (1.34), *honor* is the benefit of service and, even though a personal recognition conferred by others, it is nonetheless their recognition of service to others. In short, an individual's *auctoritas*, attained over a career-long demonstration of *dignitas*, resulted in personal *honor*. This *honor*, in turn, became public *gloria*, which could be recognized both during and after one's life. Taken in synthesis, Ciceronian *ethos* can be illustrated by the following diagram.



GROUNDED IN AUDIENCE PERCEPTION AND APPROVAL

The above diagram illustrates how the rhetor's attempt to highlight traits provides a manifestation of qualities subsumed under *dignitas*. This entechnic feature requires the audience's interaction, for it is with the audience that the rhetor both cocreates and shares the meaning and recognition of such acts, which in turn provide the "proof" of the rhetor's character. Created through discrete rhetorical events, these proofs carry over into a rhetor's reputation and can be brought to subsequent rhetorical acts, their transportation having the status of (now) atechnic proofs, that is, a reputation not demonstrated within a discourse but carried to it. The benefits of this developing *ethos*, seen under the concepts of *auctoritas*, *honor*, and *gloria*, continue in the interaction between rhetor and audience because it is with the public that the rhetor's

ethos is developed and sanctioned. The ultimate result, *potestas* (power) in life and continued *gloria* after death, reveals a source of cultural power and reputation that was attractive not only to Cicero but doubtless to other Roman rhetors as well. Cicero saw rhetoric as a source of power (Enos, "Cicero's Forensic Oratory"), a means by which he could make an impact on Roman society. From the perspective of this discussion, the benefits of Ciceronian *ethos* were the routes to the attainment of *potestas*—that is, not to *imperium* in the sense of the normal sanctions of power provided by an office with charged responsibilities and authority (*De Legibus* 3.9) but to the personal power that develops out of one's character (*Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem* 1.1.22).

Conclusion

As mentioned in the opening passages of this chapter, the term *conciliare*, or the securing of good will, is neither Cicero's equivalent nor his corresponding term for Aristotle's notion of *ethos*. Rather, Cicero uses no single word that is an equivalent to *ethos*, particularly as used by Aristotle. In fact, starting with Aristotle's notions in order to capture Cicero's views is an imprecise approach, since Cicero did not hesitate to advance his own views and, although recognizing the ideas of Aristotle, did not hesitate to provide his own interpretation of *ethos* appropriate to his time and culture. In other words, Cicero fashioned a uniquely Latinized *ethos*. *Conciliare* is the result of *ethos* but not the dynamics of *ethos* itself. *Conciliare* is an indirect product of *ethos*, the result of *ethos* as the response to traits shared with the audience but not the creation of *ethos* itself nor even a part of the process.

Cicero's remarks about *auctoritas*, *honor*, and *gloria* provide much information about his views on *ethos*. There is no doubt that *ethos*, as created and transmitted in the act of discourse, extends beyond the immediate rhetorical situation and develops over time; that is, *ethos* is being continually created between the rhetor and the public. The sustained formation of this *ethos* is manifested in *auctoritas*, and with it come the benefits of a personal *honor* and a public *gloria* of communal recognition. Clearly, whether in the

immediate context or in the long-term formation of *ethos*, the rhetor and the audience together play a role in its creation, roles that are inextricably bound. The constituent elements of *ethos* are important, moreover, not only as traits but as manifestations made evident to and by the audience. That is, Cicero's theoretical statements on rhetoric reveal that he believed qualities subsumed under the headings of *ingenium*, *prudentia*, and *diligentia* were important not only as capacities of the rhetor but also as manifestations recognized by the audience. It is through the audience's identification of such traits that the rhetor's *ethos* is created within the discourse and establishes the basis for its own sustained effect over time. As the audience comes to view the rhetor as a person of capacity and sagacity, they have, with the rhetor, cocreated the meaning of these qualities and validated these attributes as proof of the rhetor's credibility. The ultimate benefits of *potestas* and *gloria* show the immediate power of creating *ethos*, as well as its sustaining influence, and confirm its centrality in classical rhetoric. For Cicero, *ethos* was not only a "proof" created within the discourse; indirectly, *ethos* was manifested in the development of personal power and public glory.

Notes

1. All translations appearing in this work were done by Richard Leo Enos, and all citations follow the standardized format of classical sources. Recommended Latin editions of Cicero's *Rhetorica* are published by Oxford (Clarendon Press). The Augustus S. Wilkins edition of *De Oratore* published by Georg Olms is also recommended. For English translations with the original Latin texts, consult the Loeb Classical Library series published by Harvard University Press.
2. Cicero mentions *ethos* in the opening passages of *De Fato* (1.1) when discussing the topic of ethical character (*mores*) in philosophy; see also Grimaldi, "Auditors' Role" 75.
3. For example, when Cicero uses *conciliare* in *De Oratore* 2.128, 129, he is discussing the appropriate style for maximizing the effect of ethical proof and not *ethos* itself; cf. Fantham's discussion of *conciliare* with *lenitas* (263).
4. Cicero's *De Finibus* provides an explicit discussion on the nature of *ingenium* (5.36).

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