

The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy

The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of
the Major Presocratics

PART 2

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 CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

2010

19B *Dissoi Logoi*

Introduction

This treatise, found with manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus, is evidently a sophistic treatise from the end of the fifth century BC, as indicated by a reference to the Peloponnesian War as a recent event. It is written in the Doric dialect and contains a number of teaching techniques including model arguments, dialogue, and poetry citations. It breaks off with an introduction to the study of techniques of memorization, suggesting the work was a brief *technē* or textbook of rhetoric.

The author's style of presenting opposed arguments on a given topic reminds us of Protagoras' similar technique. The present treatise is, however, lacking in the insight and rigor ancient sources lead us to expect of Protagoras. At best it is a second-rate work, which shows little appreciation of the logical or philosophical issues associated with the topic surveyed. Despite its shortcomings, it gives us a glimpse of sophistic teaching practices in its time. And we see in its topics a number of issues treated (more subtly) in Plato's Socratic dialogues, and hence belonging to the intellectual context of the period.

Texts

ΔΙΣΣΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ

I Περὶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ κακῶ¹

Δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων περὶ τῶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ τῶ κακῶ. τοὶ² μὲν γὰρ λέγοντι, ὡς ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν· τοὶ δὲ, ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶη, τοῖς δὲ κακόν, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοτὲ δὲ κακόν. (2) ἔγωγ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῖσδε ποτιτίθεμαι· σκέψομαι δὲ ἐκ τῶ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ, ὡς³ ἐπιμελὲς⁴ βρώσιός τε καὶ πόσιος καὶ ἀφροδισίων· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀσθενοῦντι μὲν κακόν,⁵ ὑγιαίνοντι δὲ καὶ δεομένῳ ἀγαθόν.⁶ (3) καὶ ἀκρασία τοίνυν τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατέσι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ πωλεῦντι ταῦτα καὶ μισθαρνέοντι ἀγαθόν. νόσος τοίνυν τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῦντι κακόν,⁷ τοῖς δὲ ἰατροῖς ἀγαθόν. ὁ τοίνυν θάνατος τοῖς μὲν ἀποθανοῦσι κακόν, τοῖς δ' ἐνταφιοπῶλαις καὶ τυμβοποιῖς ἀγαθόν. (4) γεωργία τε καλῶς ἐξευείκασα τῶς καρπῶς τοῖς μὲν γεωργοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἐμπόροις κακόν. τὰς τοίνυν ὀλκάδας συντριβεσθαι καὶ παραθραύεσθαι⁸ τῷ μὲν ναυκλήρῳ κακόν, τοῖς δὲ ναυπαγοῖς ἀγαθόν. (5) ἔτι <δὲ>⁹ τὸν σίδαρον κατέσθεσθαι καὶ ἀμβλύνεσθαι καὶ συντριβεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τῷ δὲ χαλκῇ ἀγαθόν. καὶ μὲν τὸν κέραμον παραθραύεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τοῖς δὲ κεραμεῦσιν ἀγαθόν. τὰ δὲ ὑποδήματα κατατριβεσθαι καὶ διαρρηγνυσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τῷ δὲ σκυτῇ ἀγαθόν.

(6) ἐν τοίνυν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῖς γυμνικοῖς¹⁰ καὶ τοῖς μωσικοῖς καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς· αὐτίκα ἐν τῷ γυμνικῷ τῷ σταδιοδρόμῳ ἂ νίκα τῷ μὲν νικῶντι ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἡσσημένοις κακόν. (7) καττωτὸ¹¹ δὲ καὶ τοὶ παλαιστοὶ καὶ πύκται καὶ τοὶ ἄλλοι πάντες μωσικοί· αὐτίκα ἂ κιθαρῳδίᾳ¹² τῷ μὲν νικῶντι ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἡσσημένοις κακόν. (8) ἐν τε τῷ πολέμῳ (καὶ τὰ νεώτατα¹³ πρῶτον ἔρω) ἂ τῶν¹⁴ Λακεδαιμονίων νίκα, ἂν¹⁵ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναίως καὶ τῶς συμμάχως, Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν ἀγαθόν, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ καὶ¹⁶ τοῖς συμμάχοις κακόν. ἂ τε νίκα, ἂν τοὶ¹⁷ Ἕλληνας τὸν Πέρσαν ἐνίκασαν, τοῖς μὲν Ἕλλησιν ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις κακόν. (9) ἂ τοίνυν τοῦ Ἰλίου αἴρεσις τοῖς μὲν Ἀχαιοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ Τρωσὶ κακόν. καδδὲ ταύτῳ καὶ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἀργείων πάθη.

¹ tit. om. P1-2: ἀγαθοῦ... κακοῦ cett.: corr. H. Stephanus. ² P1-2: τοῖς B: οἱ cett.

³ Wilamowitz: ὄν codd. ⁴ ἐπιμελὲς H. ⁵ P1-2: κακὰ ἐστι(v) cett.

⁶ P1-2: ἀγαθὰ cett. ⁷ τοῖς δὲ πωλεῦντι... κακόν P1-2: om. cett.

⁸ περιθραύεσθαι P1-2. ⁹ suppl. Vossianus. ¹⁰ Blass: γυμναστικοῖς codd.

¹¹ Matthaeus de Varis (Vatic. gr. 1338): καὶ τούτω codd. ¹² ὁ κιθαρῳδός P1-2.

¹³ Koen: τῶ νεώτητι, τὰ νεώτατ(ο)ι codd.: τὰ νεωστὶ North.

¹⁴ ἂ τῶν Koen: αὐτῶν codd. ¹⁵ Weber: ἐν αἱ codd.

¹⁶ Ἀθηναίοις δὲ καὶ om. P1-2, δὲ post τοῖς.

¹⁷ ἂν τοὶ Schaeffer: ἂν τοὶ P1-2: ἂν τε B: ἂν τε cett.

Debated Questions (*Dissoi Logoi, Dialexeis*)

I On good and bad

There are competing accounts in Greece among those who philosophize about good and bad. Some say that the good is one thing, bad another. Others say that they are the same, and that to some a thing will be good, to others it will be bad, and to the same individual it will be at one time good, at another time bad. (2) I myself agree with the latter side; and I shall consider the question on the basis of human life, for the sake of which food, drink, and sexual relations matter; these things are bad for someone who is sick, but they are good for someone who is healthy and in need of them. (3) And further, lack of self control is bad for those who lack it, but good for those who sell and make money by the transaction. Again, sickness is bad for the sick, but good for physicians. Further, death is bad for those who die, but good for undertakers and makers of tombs. (4) Agriculture which successfully produces crops is good for the farmers but bad for the importers. Further, for ships to be wrecked and shattered is bad for the shipowner, but good for the shipbuilders. (5) Again, when an iron tool is corroded, blunted, and worn out, it is bad for everyone else, but good for the blacksmith. Moreover, when a pot breaks it is bad for everyone else, but it is good for potters. For shoes to wear out and split is bad for everyone else, but good for the shoemaker.

(6) Now consider the area of athletic, musical, and military competitions; for example in athletic competition, victory in a foot race is good for the winner, but bad for the losers. (7) It is the same for wrestlers and boxers, and all the musicians: for example lyre-playing is good for the winner, but bad for the losers. (8) And in war (to mention the most recent one first), the victory which the Spartans won over the Athenians and their allies was good for the Spartans, but bad for the Athenians and their allies. The victory which the Greeks won over the Persians was good for the Greeks, but bad for the barbarians. (9) Further, the capture of Troy was good for the Achaeans, but bad for the Trojans. And likewise for the misfortunes which befell the Thebans and the Argives.

(10) καὶ ἅ τῶν Κενταύρων καὶ Λαπιθῶν μάχα τοῖς μὲν Λαπιθαῖσι ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ Κενταύροις κακόν. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἅ τῶν θεῶν καὶ Γιγάντων λεγόμενα μάχα καὶ νίκα τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ Γίγασιν κακόν.

(11) ἄλλος δὲ λόγος λέγεται, ὡς ἄλλο μὲν τάγαθόν εἴη, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν, διαφέρον ὥσπερ καὶ τῶνυμα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτον διαιρεῦμαι τὸν τρόπον· δοκῶ γὰρ οὐδέ² διάδαλόν ἦμεν, ποῖον ἀγαθόν καὶ ποῖον κακόν, αἱ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐκότερον εἴη· καὶ γὰρ θαυμαστόν κ' εἴη.

(12) οἶμαι δὲ οὐδέ κ' αὐτὸν ἔχειν³ ἀποκρίνασθαι, αἱ τις [αὐτὸν]⁴ ἔροιτο τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα· “εἶπον δὴ μοι, ἦδη τύ τι τοῖ γονέες ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν⁵,” φαίη κα· “καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα.” “τύ⁶ ἄρα κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ τούτοις ὀφείλεις, αἶπερ τωῦτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῶι κακῶι. (13) τί δέ, τὼς συγγενέας ἦδη τι ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησας; τὼς ἄρα συγγενέας κακὸν ἐποίησας. τί δέ, τὼς ἐχθρῶς ἦδη κακόν⁷ ἐποίησας; καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μέγιστα⁸ ἄρα ἀγαθὰ ἐποίησας. (14) ἄγε δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε ἀποκρίναί. ἄλλο τι ἢ τὼς πτωχῶς οἰκτίρεις, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ⁹ ἔχοντι, <καὶ>¹⁰ πάλιν εὐδαιμονίζεις, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράσσοντι, αἶπερ τωῦτό κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.”

(15) τὸν δὲ βασιλῆ¹¹ τὸν μέγαν οὐδὲν κωλύει ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι τοῖς πτωχοῖς. τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶι πολλὰ κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἐστίν, αἱ γὰ¹² τωῦτόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν καὶ κακόν. καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ τῶ παντὸς εἰρήσθω. (16) εἶμι δὲ καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῶ¹³ ἐσθίεν καὶ πίνεν καὶ ἀφροδισιάζεν. τωῦτό¹⁴ γὰρ τοῖς ἀσθενεῦντι ταῦτα ποιέν ἀγαθόν ἐστίν [αὐτοῖς],¹⁵ αἶπερ τωῦτόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν καὶ κακόν· καὶ τοῖς νοσέοντι κακόν ἐστὶ τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ ἀγαθόν, αἶπερ τωῦτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν τῶι κακῶι. (17) καδδὲ τόδε καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, τὰ ἐν τῶι ἐμπροσθεν λόγῳ εἴρηται. καὶ οὐ λέγω, τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πειρῶμαι διδάσκειν, ὡς οὐ τωῦτόν εἴη τὸ κακόν καὶ τάγαθόν, ἀλλ' <ἄλλο>¹⁶ ἐκάτερον.

2 Περὶ καλοῦ¹⁷ καὶ αἰσχροῦ¹⁸

λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ καλοῦ καὶ <τῶ>¹⁹ αἰσχροῦ δισοῖ λόγοι. τοῖ μὲν γὰρ φαντι, ἄλλο μὲν ἦμεν τὸ καλόν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, διαφέρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶνυμα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τοὶ δὲ τωῦτό καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. (2) κἀγὼ πειρασεύμαι, τόνδε τὸν τρόπον ἐξαγεύμενος. αὐτίκα γὰρ παιδί²⁰ ὠραῖωι ἔραστῆι μὲν χρηστῶι²¹ χαρίζεσθαι καλόν, μὴ ἔραστῆι δὲ καλῶι²² αἰσχρόν.

(10) The battle of Lapiths and Centaurs was good for the Lapiths but bad for the Centaurs. Moreover the so-called Battle of Gods and Giants and the ensuing victory was good for the gods but bad for the giants.

(11) There is another account that good is one thing, bad another, differing in fact as in name. I myself will explain this view: it would appear that I am saying nothing clear about the nature of good and bad, if the two things are the same and not different, which would be incredible. (12) Indeed, I do not think a person holding this view would have an answer, if someone asked him:

“Tell me, have your parents done anything good for you?”

“Indeed, many great things,” he would reply.

“Then you owe them many great bad things, since good is the same as bad.

(13) Well then, have you done good for your kinsmen? Then you have done bad to them. Well then, have you done your enemies any bad? Then you have done them many of the greatest benefits. (14) Come, then, answer me this too: What else do you do but feel sorry for beggars because they have many bad things, <and> at the same time admire them, because they enjoy many goods, given that bad and good are the same?”

(15) Nothing prevents the Great King from being in the same condition as the beggars. For his many great good things are many great bad things, if good and bad are the same, and these things have been shown in every case. (16) I shall proceed point by point starting with eating and drinking and sexual relations. For in the same way it is good for the sick to do these things, if the good is the same as the bad. And being sick is bad for the sick, and also good, if the good is the same as the bad. (17) And so it is for every case referred to in the foregoing argument. And I have not said what the good is, but I have tried to show that the bad and the good are not the same, but each is <distinct>.

2 On right and wrong **Or: Fine & Shameful (Dillon/Gergel)**

There are also competing accounts of the right and <the> wrong. Some say the right is one thing, the wrong another, differing in physical reality as in name. Others say right and wrong are the same. (2) I shall try to explain it in this way. For example, it is right for a youth in his prime to gratify a respectable lover, but it is wrong to do this for a non-lover, even a handsome one.

¹ B P1-2 R: αὐτό cett. ² P1-2: οὐ cett.

³ P1-2: ἔσχειν, ἔσχον cett. ⁴ secl. Diels: αὐτὸν αὐτὸν P6 V2.

⁵ W. Schulze: τι τὼς (τοῦς) γονέας ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησας codd. ⁶ σύ P3; τὸ P1-2.

⁷ P1-2: κακῶς cett. ⁸ μέγιστα P1-2: μεγάλα cett. ⁹ Diels: μεγάλα codd.

¹⁰ suppl. Schanz. ¹¹ P1-2: βασιλῆα cett. ¹² αἱ γὰ Diels: αἶκα codd. ¹³ F2 P1 R: τῶν cett.

¹⁴ Orelli: τοῦτο codd.: ταῦτα Mullach. ¹⁵ secl. Trieber. ¹⁶ suppl. Blass.

¹⁷ κακοῦ B. ¹⁸ τίτ. om. P1-2. ¹⁹ suppl. Trieber. ²⁰ Blass: παιδίω codd.

²¹ P1-2: χρηστῶ μὲν cett.: secl. Wilamowitz. ²² secl. Wilamowitz.

(3) καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας λοῦσθαι ἔνδοι¹ καλόν, ἐν παλαιστραὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν – ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐν παλαιστραὶ καὶ ἐν γυμνασίῳ καλόν. (4) καὶ συνίμεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἐν ἀσυχίᾳ μὲν καλόν, ὅπου τοίχοις κρυφθῆσεται· ἔξω δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὅπου τις ὄψεται. (5) καὶ τῷ μὲν αὐτᾶς² συνίμεν ἀνδρὶ καλόν, ἀλλοτρίῳ δὲ αἰσχιστον.³ καὶ τῷ γ' ἀνδρὶ τᾷ μὲν ἑαυτῷ γυναικὶ συνίμεν καλόν, ἀλλοτρίᾳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. (6) καὶ κοσμεῖσθαι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ χρίεσθαι καὶ χρυσία περιάπτεσθαι, τῷ μὲν ἀνδρὶ αἰσχρόν, τᾷ δὲ γυναικὶ καλόν. (7) καὶ τῶς μὲν φίλως εὖ ποιῆν καλόν, τῶς δὲ ἐχθρῶς αἰσχρόν. καὶ τῶς μὲν πολεμίως φεύγεν αἰσχρόν, τῶς δὲ ἐν σταδίῳ ἀγωνιστὰς καλόν. (8) καὶ τῶς μὲν φίλως καὶ τῶς πολίτας φονεύεν αἰσχρόν, τῶς δὲ πολεμίως καλόν. καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ πάντων.

(9) εἴμι δ' <ἐφ>⁴ ἅ τὰ πόλιές τε αἰσχρὰ ἀγῆνται καὶ τὰ ἔθνεα. αὐτίκα Λακεδαιμονίοις τὰς κόρας γυμνάζεσθαι <καί>⁵ ἀχειριδῶτως καὶ ἀχίτυνας παρέρπτεν καλόν. ἴωσι δὲ αἰσχρόν. (10) καὶ <τήνοισ>⁶ τῶς παῖδας μὴ μανθάνειν μωσικὰ καὶ γράμματα καλόν. ἴωσι δ' αἰσχρόν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ταῦτα πάντα. (11) Θεσσαλοῖσι δὲ καλόν τῶς ἵππων δὲ ἀγέλας λαβόντι αὐτῶι⁸ δαμάσαι καὶ τῶς⁹ ὄρεας· βῶν τε λαβόντι αὐτῶι¹⁰ σφάξαι καὶ ἐκδεῖραι καὶ κατακόψαι, ἐν Σικελίᾳ δὲ αἰσχρόν καὶ δώλων ἔργα. (12) Μακεδόσι δὲ καλόν δοκεῖ ἡμεν τὰς κόρας, πρὶν ἀνδρὶ γάμασθαι, ἐρᾶσθαι καὶ ἀνδρὶ συγγίνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ δὲ κα γάμηται,¹¹ αἰσχρόν· Ἑλλασί δ' ἄμφω αἰσχρόν. (13) τοῖς δὲ Θραξί κόσμος τὰς κόρας στίζεσθαι· τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις τιμωρία¹² τὰ στίγματα τοῖς ἀδικέοντι.¹³ τοὶ δὲ Σκύθαι καλόν νομίζοντι, ὅς <κ>¹⁴ ἀνδρα κατακανῶν¹⁵ ἐκδεῖρας τὰν κεφαλὰν τὸ μὲν κόμιον πρὸ τοῦ ἵππου φορῆι,¹⁶ τὸ δ' ὀστέον χρυσώσας <ῆ>¹⁷ καὶ ἀργυρώσας πίνη¹⁸ ἔξ αὐτοῦ καὶ σπένδει¹⁹ τοῖς θεοῖς· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλασιν οὐδὲ κ' ἐς τὰν αὐτὰν οἰκίαν συνεισελεθῆν βούλοιτ²⁰ τις τοιαῦτα ποιήσαντι. (14) Μασσαγέται δὲ τῶς γονέας κατακόψαντες κατέσθοντι, καὶ τάφος κάλλιστος δοκεῖ ἡμεν ἐν τοῖς τέκνοις τεθᾶφθαι· ἐν δὲ τᾷ Ἑλλάδι αἱ τις ταῦτα ποιήσαι,²¹ ἐξελαθεῖς ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος κακῶς κα²² ἀποθάνοι ὡς αἰσχρὰ καὶ δεινὰ ποιέων. (15) τοὶ δὲ Πέρσαι κοσμεῖσθαι τε ὡσπερ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τῶς ἀνδρας καλόν νομίζοντι, καὶ τᾷ θυγατρὶ καὶ τᾷ μητρὶ καὶ τᾷ ἀδελφᾷ συνίμεν· τοὶ δὲ Ἑλλανες καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ παράνομα. (16) Λυδοῖς τοῖσιν τὰς κόρας πορνευθεῖσας καὶ ἀργύριον ἐνεργάσασθαι²³ καὶ οὕτως γάμασθαι καλόν δοκεῖ ἡμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλασιν οὐδεὶς κα θέλοι γᾶμαι.²⁴

¹ Vahlen: ἐνιοι P1-2: ἐνδον cett. ² Diels: αὐτὰς codd.

³ F2 P1 P3 R V1-2 Z (post corr.): αἰσχρόν cett. ⁴ suppl. Stephanus. ⁵ suppl. Blass.

⁶ suppl. Wilamowitz. ⁷ P1-2: τὰς cett. ⁸ Blass: αὐτῶς codd. ⁹ E: τὰς cett.

¹⁰ Blass: αὐτῶς codd. ¹¹ Blass: δὲ καὶ γαμήται codd.

¹² Weber: τιμωρίαν P1-2 (om. cett.). ¹³ τοῖς... ἀδικέοντι P1-2: om. cett.

¹⁴ suppl. Blass. ¹⁵ Blass: κατ(α)κτανῶν P1-2; κ(τ)ανῶν cett.

¹⁶ Blass: φορεῖν P2: φορεῖ cett. ¹⁷ suppl. Diels. ¹⁸ πίνη P1-2: πίνει cett.

¹⁹ Blass: σπένδει codd. ²⁰ Blass: βούλοιτ' ἄν codd. ²¹ Blass: ποιήση codd. (ποιήσα⁹ P2).

²² κακῶς κα Blass: κακὰ codd. ²³ Weber: ἐνεργήσασθαι codd. ²⁴ Blass: γαμᾶν codd.

(3) And it is right for women to bathe indoors, but wrong to do so in the palaestra – but it is right for men to wash in the palaestra and the gymnasium. (4) And it is right for a woman to have sexual intercourse with her husband in private, when she is behind closed doors; but it is wrong to do this outside, where anyone may see. (5) And it is right for a woman to have sexual intercourse with her husband, but it is very wrong to have intercourse with someone else's husband. And it is right for a man to have intercourse with his own wife, but wrong to have intercourse with someone else's wife. (6) And to adorn oneself, to put on make-up, and to wear golden jewelry is wrong for a man, but right for a woman. (7) To do good to one's friends is right, but to do good to one's enemies is wrong. And to run away from one's enemies in battle is wrong, but to run away from one's competitors in a foot race is right. (8) To slay one's friends and fellow citizens is wrong, but to slay enemies in battle is right, and so on in every case.

(9) I shall proceed <to> what cities and peoples consider wrong. For example it is right among the Spartans for girls to exercise naked and appear in public in clothing without sleeves and blouses; but it is wrong to the Ionians. (10) And <for the former> it is right for children not to learn music and reading and writing, but for the Ionians it is wrong not to know all these things. (11) Among the people of Thessaly it is right for someone to take for himself horses and mules from the herds and tame them, and to take for oneself cattle and slaughter, skin, and butcher them; but in Sicily this is considered wrong and a job for slaves. (12) Among the Macedonians it is considered right for girls before they marry to fall in love and have relations with a man, but after they marry, wrong; among the Greeks it is considered wrong in both cases. (13) Among the Thracians it is a mark of beauty for girls to have tattoos; for everyone else tattoos are a punishment for a crime. The Scythians consider it right, when someone has killed a man in battle, to remove the scalp and hang it on the front of his horse, while he covers the skull with gold <or> silver and uses it for a drinking cup and to offer libations to the gods. But among the Greeks no one would even be willing go into the same house as someone who had done such things. (14) The Massagetae cut up their parents' bodies and eat them, thinking the best place to bury them is in their children's bellies; in Greece if someone did this, he would be expelled from Greece and die in disgrace as having committed an abomination. (15) The Persians think it right for men to adorn themselves like women, and to lie with their daughter, mother, or sister; but the Greeks consider this wrong and unlawful. (16) Moreover, among the Lydians it is considered right for girls to earn money as prostitutes and then to marry; but among the Greeks no one would think of marrying a girl who did this.

(17) Αἰγύπτιοί τε οὐ ταῦτά νομίζοντι καλὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις· τῆιδε μὲν γὰρ γυναῖκας ὑφαίνειν καὶ <ἔρια>¹ ἐργάζεσθαι καλόν, ἀλλὰ τῆιδε τῶς ἄνδρας, τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας πράσσειν, ἅπερ τῆιδε τοῖ ἄνδρες. τὸν παλὸν δεύειν ταῖς χερσὶ, τὸν δὲ σῖτον τοῖς ποσὶ, τῆνοις καλόν, ἀλλ' ἄμιν τὸ ἐναντίον.

(18) οἶμαι δ', αἱ² τις τὰ αἰσχρὰ³ ἐς ἓν κελεύει συνενεῖκαι πάντας ἀνθρώπως, ἃ ἕκαστοι νομίζοντι, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἀθρόων τούτων⁴ τὰ καλὰ⁵ λαβέν, ἃ ἕκαστοι ἀγηνται, οὐδὲ ἐν⁶ <κα>⁷ καλλειφθῆμεν,⁸ ἀλλὰ πάντας πάντα διαλαβέν. οὐ γὰρ πάντες ταῦτά νομίζοντι. (19) παρεξοῦμαι δὲ καὶ ποιήμα τι·

καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄλλον ὧδε θνητοῖσιν νόμον
 ὄψηι διαιρῶν· οὐδὲν ἦν⁹ πάντη καλόν,
 οὐδ' αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτ'¹⁰ ἐποίησεν λαβῶν
 ὁ καιρὸς αἰσχρὰ καὶ διαλλάξας καλὰ.

(20) ὡς δὲ τὸ σύνολον εἶπαι,¹¹ πάντα καιρῶι μὲν καλὰ ἐντι, ἐν ἀκαιρίαι δ' αἰσχρὰ. τί ὧν διεπραξάμην; ἔφαν ἀποδείξειν ταῦτά αἰσχρὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐόντα, καὶ ἀπέδειξα ἐν τούτοις πᾶσι.

(21) λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῷ αἰσχρῷ καὶ <τῷ>¹² καλῷ, ὡς ἄλλο ἐκάτερον εἶη. ἐπεὶ αἱ τις ἐρωτάσαι τῶς λέγοντας, ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ πράγμα αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν ἐστιν, αἱ ποκά τι αὐτοῖς καλὸν ἔργασται, <καὶ>¹³ αἰσχρὸν ὁμολογησοῦντι, αἵπερ τωῦτόν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν. (22) καὶ αἱ τινὰ γὰ καλὸν οἶδαντι ἄνδρα, τοῦτον καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸν αὐτόν· καὶ αἱ τινὰ γὰ λευκόν, καὶ μέλανα τοῦτον τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ¹⁴ καλὸν γ' ἐστὶ τῶς θεῶς σέβεσθαι, καὶ αἰσχρὸν αὔ¹⁵ τῶς θεῶς σέβεσθαι, αἵπερ τωῦτόν αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν ἐστι. (23) καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ ἀπάντων εἰρήσθω μοι· τρέφομαι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν, ὃν λέγοντι. (24) αἱ γὰρ τὰν γυναῖκα καλόν ἐστι κοσμεῖσθαι, τὰν γυναῖκα <καὶ>¹⁶ αἰσχρὸν κοσμεῖσθαι, αἵπερ τωῦτόν αἰσχρὸν καὶ καλόν· καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τωῦτόν. (25) ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι ἐστὶ καλὸν τὰς παῖδας γυμνάζεσθαι, ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι ἐστὶν αἰσχρὸν τὰς παῖδας γυμνάζεσθαι, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. (26) λέγοντι¹⁷ δέ, ὡς αἱ τινες τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐθνέων πάντοθεν συνενεῖκαιεν, ἔπειτα συγκαλέσαντες¹⁸ κελεύοιεν, ἃ τις καλὰ νομίζοι,¹⁹ λαμβάνεν, πάντα κα²⁰ ἐν καλῷ ἀπενειχθῆμεν. ἐγὼ θαυμάζω, αἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ συνεχεθῆντα καλὰ ἐσεῖται, καὶ οὐχ οἷάπερ ἦνθεν.

(17) The Egyptians do not have the same customs as others. Here it is right for women to weave and prepare <wool>, but there for men to do it, while it is right for women do there what men do here. It is considered right for them to knead mud with their hands and dough with their feet; but for us the reverse.

(18) I think if one were to bid all men to gather together what is wrong, according to their opinions, into one pile, and from this collection to take what is right, according to the views of each, not one thing <would> be left, but all would take all. For all do not have the same beliefs. (19) I shall recite a poem:

For the diverse customs of mortals thus
 you will see as you distinguish them: nothing was right in every way,
 nor wrong, but the situation itself
 made them wrong, and changing made the same things right.

(20) To speak generally, everything is right in the appropriate situation, but wrong in the inappropriate situation. What have I accomplished then? I set out to prove that the same things are wrong and right, and I demonstrated this in all these cases.

(21) There is also the view concerning the wrong and <the> right, that they are different things. For if someone should ask those who maintain that wrong and right are the same thing, whether anything right has ever been done by them, they will have to agree it is <also> wrong, if wrong and right are really the same thing. (22) And if they know a good man, he will also be bad; and if he is pale, he will also be tanned. If it is right to worship the gods, it will, by the same token, also be wrong to worship them, if wrong and right are the same. (23) And the same argument of mine should be applied to all cases. Now I shall turn to the argument which they give. (24) If it is right for a woman to adorn herself, it is <also> wrong for her to do so, if wrong and right are the same, and so on. (25) In Sparta it is right for girls to exercise naked, and also in Sparta it is wrong to do so, and so on. (26) They say that if one were to gather together what is wrong from all nations everywhere, then they were to assemble everyone and bid them take whatever anyone thought right, all these things would be taken away as being right. I would be surprised if the things gathered as wrong were also considered right, and not such as they came.

¹ suppl. Valckenaer. ² Wilamowitz: ἄν codd. ³ North: καλὰ codd. ⁴ Weber: τοι codd.

⁵ North: αἰσχρὰ codd. ⁶ Diels: οὐδὲν codd. ⁷ suppl. Weber.

⁸ P1: καλυφθεῖμεν, καλυφθῆμεν cett. ⁹ Nauck: ἄν codd. ¹⁰ Valckenaer: ταῦτ' codd.

¹¹ E: εἶπεν cett. ¹² suppl. Blass. ¹³ suppl. Wilamowitz. ¹⁴ Diels: καὶ codd.

¹⁵ Wilamowitz: ἄρ, ἄρα codd. ¹⁶ suppl. Diels.

¹⁷ P1-2: λέγονται cett. ¹⁸ Schanz: συγκαλεσεῦντες, -οῦντες codd.

¹⁹ P1: νομίζει P2: νομίζειν cett. ²⁰ Orelli: καὶ codd.

(27) αἱ γοῦν ἵππων ἢ βῶς ἢ οἷς ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαγον, οὐκ ἄλλο τί κα ἀπάγον.¹ ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἰ² χρυσὸν ἤνεικαν, χαλκόν [ἀπτήνεικαν],³ οὐδ' αἰ⁴ ἄργυρον⁵ ἤνεικαν, μόλιβδόν κα ἀπέφερον. (28) ἀντί δ' ἄρα τῶν αἰσχυρῶν καλὰ ἀπάγοντι⁶; φέρε δὴ, αἱ ἄρα τις αἰσχυρὸν <ἄνδρα>⁷ ἄγαγε,⁸ τοῦτον δ' αὐ κα⁹ καλὸν ἀπάγει¹⁰; ποιητὰς δὲ μάρτυρας ἐπάγονται, <οἱ>¹¹ ποτὶ ἄδονάν, οὐ ποτὶ ἀλάθειαν ποιεῦντι.

3 Περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου

δισσοὶ δὲ λόγοι λέγονται καὶ περὶ τῶ δικαίου καὶ τῶ ἀδίκου.¹² καὶ τοὶ μὲν ἄλλο ἦμεν τὸ δίκαιον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀδικον· τοὶ δὲ τωὐτὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδικον· καὶ ἐγὼ τούτῳ¹³ πειρασοῦμαι τιμωρέν. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ψεύδεσθαι ὡς δίκαιόν ἐστι λεξῶ καὶ ἔξαπατᾶν. τῶς μὲν πολεμῶς ταῦτα ποιῆν <καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, τῶς δὲ φίλως>¹⁴ αἰσχυρὸν καὶ πονηρὸν ἂν ἐξείποιεν· <πῶς δὲ τῶς πολεμῶς,>¹⁵ τῶς δὲ φιλάτῳς οὐ; αὐτίκα τῶς γονέας· αἱ γὰρ δέοι τὸν πατέρα ἢ τὴν μητέρα φάρμακον πιῆν ἢ¹⁶ φαγῆν, καὶ μὴ θέλοι, οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ῥοφήματι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποτῶι δόμεν καὶ μὴ φάμεν ἐνῆμεν; (3) οὐκῶν¹⁷ ἤδη ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἔξαπατᾶν τῶς γονέας καὶ κλέπτειν μὴ τὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ βιῆσθαι τῶς φιλάτῳς δίκαιον. (4) αὐτίκα αἱ τις λυπηθεὶς τι τῶν οἰκητῶν καὶ ἀχθεσθεὶς μέλλοι αὐτὸν¹⁸ διαφθεῖρεν ἢ ξίφει ἢ σχοινίῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί, δίκαιόν ἐστι ταῦτα κλέψαι, αἱ δύναιτο, αἱ δὲ ὑστερίζαι καὶ ἔχοντα καταλάβοι, ἀφελῆσθαι βίαι; (5) ἀνδραποδίσασθαι δὲ πῶς οὐ δίκαιον τῶς πολεμῶς <κα>¹⁹ αἱ τις δύναιτο ἔλῶν πόλιν ὅταν ἀποδόσθαι; τοιχωρυχὲν δὲ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν κοινὰ οἰκήματα δίκαιον φαίνεται. αἱ γὰρ ὁ πατήρ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ, κατεστασιασμένος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, δεδεμένος εἶη, ἄρα οὐ δίκαιον διορύξαντα κλέψαι καὶ σῶσαι τὸν πατέρα;

(6) ἐπιорκῆν δέ· αἱ τις ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμῶν λαφθεὶς ὑποδέξαιτο ὁμνύων ἢ μὴ ἀφθεῖς τὴν πόλιν προδώσεν, ἄρα οὗτος δίκαιά <κα>²⁰ ποιήσαι εὐορκήσας;

(7) ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δοκῶ· ἀλλὰ μάλλον τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῶς φίλως καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ σώσαι <κα καὶ τὰ>²¹ πατρῶϊα ἐπιορκήσας. ἤδη ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν.

καὶ τὸ ἱεροσυλέν· (8) τὰ μὲν ἴδια τῶν πόλεων ἐῶ· τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τῶς Ἑλλάδος, τὰ ἐκ Δελφῶν καὶ τὰ ἐξ Ὀλυμπίας, μέλλοντος τῶ βαρβάρῳ τὴν Ἑλλάδα λαβῆν καὶ τῶς σωτηρίας ἐν χρήμασι εἰούσας, οὐ δίκαιον λαβῆν καὶ χρῆσθαι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον;

¹ Wilamowitz: ἀπάγον P4 P6 V2: ἀπάγαγον cett. ² P1-2: οὐδέ cett.

³ secl. Wilamowitz. ⁴ Weber: οὐδ' ἂν P1-2: οὐδέ cett. ⁵ Blass: ἀργύριον codd.

⁶ Wilamowitz: ἀπάγοντι codd. ⁷ suppl. Diels. ⁸ Mullach: ἀπάγαγε codd.

⁹ δ' αὐ κα Diels: δ' ἂν F2 P1 P4 P6 R: ἂν cett. ¹⁰ Diels: ἀπάγαγε codd.

¹¹ suppl. Orelli. ¹² τῶ ἀδίκῳ P3: περὶ τῶ ἀδίκῳ cett. ¹³ τοῦτο P4 P6 V2.

¹⁴ suppl. Diels. ¹⁵ suppl. Diels. ¹⁶ Blass, Schanz: καὶ codd.

¹⁷ Robinson: οὐκῶν, οὐκουν codd. ¹⁸ Stephanus: αὐτὸν codd.

¹⁹ suppl. Diels. ²⁰ suppl. Matthaëus. ²¹ κα Diels: καὶ scripsi: τὰ Matth. d. Varis, Blass.

(27) For instance, if they brought in horses, cattle, sheep, or men, they would take away nothing else. Likewise if they brought gold they would not take away bronze, and if they brought silver they would not take away lead. (28) In exchange for wrong things, then, will they take away right? Come now, if someone brought a bad <man>, would he take him away as a good man? But they call the poets as witnesses, <who> compose with a view to pleasure rather than truth.

3 On just and unjust **Or: Right & Wrong (Gagarin/Woodruff)**

There are also competing accounts of the just and the unjust. And some say the just is one thing, the unjust another. Others that just and unjust are the same. And I shall try to defend the latter view. (2) And first I will establish that it is just to lie and deceive. To do these things to one's enemies one would declare is <right and just, to do them to one's friends> is wrong and evil. <But how is it good to treat enemies in this way> and not one's friends and loved ones? For example, parents: if one should give one's father or mother medicine to drink or eat, even if the parent was unwilling to take it, would it not be just to put it in his porridge or drink without telling him? (3) Hence we see that it is just to lie and deceive one's parents and to steal one's friends' property and to use force on one's kinsmen. (4) For instance, if a family member who was sad and depressed were about to commit suicide with a knife or rope or some other device, would it not be just to steal these, if possible, but if one came too late and found him with it, to take it away by force? (5) Is it not just to enslave one's enemies, <and, > if one is able, to capture their city and sell the whole population into slavery? And it seems just to break into the public buildings of your city; for if your father were bound and condemned to death as a result of a coup by his political opponents, would it not be just to break in and steal your father to rescue him?

(6) *Swearing falsely*. If, when someone were captured by his enemies he promised with an oath to betray his city if he were released, would he be just if he kept his oath? (7) I think not; but rather a man <should> protect his city, his friends, the city's sanctuaries <and his> family property by violating the oath. Therefore it is just to swear falsely.

Robbing temples. (8) I shall pass over the property of individual cities. The common property of Greece, the treasures of Delphi and Olympia – would it not be just to take it and use it for war against the barbarian who is bent on invading Greece, when money would provide the means of salvation?

(9) φονεύειν δὲ τὼς φιλάτῳς δίκαιον· ἐπεὶ καὶ Ὀρέστας καὶ Ἄλκμαίων· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἔχρησε δίκαια αὐτῶς¹ ποιῆσαι.

(10) ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς τέχνας τρέψομαι καὶ τὰ τῶν² ποιητῶν. ἐν γὰρ τραγωδιοποιίαι καὶ ζωγραφίαι ὅστις <κα>³ πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῆι ὁμοία τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὗτος ἄριστος. (11) θέλω δὲ καὶ ποιημάτων⁴ παλαιότερων μαρτύριον ἐπαγαγέσθαι. Κλεοβουλίνης·

ἄνδρ' εἶδον κλέπτοντα καὶ ἐξαπατῶντα βιαίως,⁵
καὶ τὸ βίαι ῥέξαι τοῦτο δικαιοτάτον.

(12) ἦν πάλα ταῦτα· Αἰσχύλου δὲ ταῦτα·

ἀπάτης δίκαιας οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ θεός,

<καί·>⁶

ψευδῶν δὲ καιρὸν ἔσθ' ὅπου⁷ τιμῆι θεός.

(13) λέγεται δὲ καὶ τῷδε ἀντίος λόγος, ὡς ἄλλο τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδικόν ἐστιν, διαφέρον ὡσπερ καὶ τῶνυμα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐπεὶ αἱ τῆς ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας, ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἀδικον καὶ δίκαιον, αἱ ἦδη⁸ τι δίκαιον περὶ τὼς γυνέας ἐπραξαν, ὁμολογησοῦντι.⁹ καὶ ἀδικον ἄρα. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀδικον καὶ δίκαιον ὁμολογέοντι ἡμεν. (14) φέρε ἄλλο δὴ.¹⁰ αἱ τίνα γινώσκεις¹¹ δίκαιον ἄνδρα, καὶ ἀδικον ἄρα τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ μέγαν τοῖνον καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τωυτόν.¹² καὶ <αί>¹³ λέγοιτο¹⁴ “πολλὰ ἀδικήσας ἀποθανέτω,¹⁵ ἀποθανέτω¹⁶ <καὶ πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος.¹⁶ (15) καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλις. εἶμι δὲ ἐφ' ἃ λέγοντες ἀξιόοντι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδικον ἀποδεικνύειν. (16) τὸ γὰρ κλέπτειν τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δίκαιον, καὶ ἀδικον ἀποδεικνύειν τοῦτο αὐτό, αἱ κ' ἀληθῆς ὁ τήνων λόγος, καὶ τᾶλλα καττωυτό. (17) τέχνας δὲ ἐπάγονται, ἐν αἷς οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδικον. καὶ τοὶ ποιηταὶ οὐ [το]¹⁷ ποτὶ ἀλάθειαν, ἀλλὰ ποτὶ τὰς ἄδονας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ποιήματα ποιέοντι.

4 Περὶ ἀλαθείας καὶ ψεύδεος

λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶ ψεύδεος καὶ τῶ ἀλαθείας¹⁸ δισσοὶ λόγοι, ὧν ὁ μὲν φασι, ἄλλον μὲν τὸν ψεύσαν ἡμεν λόγον, ἄλλον δὲ τὸν ἀλαθῆ· τοὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν αὐ.

¹ Stephanus: αὐτῶ, αὐτῶ codd. ² τὰ τῶν Diels: ταῦτα codd. ³ suppl. Blass.

⁴ Diels: ποιήματα τῶν codd. ⁵ Matth. d. Varis: βία· ὡς codd.

⁶ suppl. Diels. ⁷ Hermann: ὅποι codd.

⁸ Wilamowitz: αἱ κα δὴ codd. ⁹ Matth. d. Varis: ὁμολογησοῦντι P1: ὁμολογοῦντι cett.

¹⁰ Diels: ἄλλον δὲ codd. ¹¹ Diels: γινώσκει L: γινώσκη codd.

¹² P3: κατὰ ταυτόν F2 P1-2 R V1: κατ' αὐτόν H: τὰ κατ' αὐτόν P6 V2.

¹³ suppl. Friedländer. ¹⁴ Kranz: τοὶ codd. ¹⁵ C P6 V2 Y1-2: om. cett.

¹⁶ suppl. Kranz. ¹⁷ Schanz: καὶ τὸ P3: οὗτο vel οὐτό cett.

¹⁸ Diels: τὰς ἀλαθείας P3: τῶ ἀλαθείας P4: τῶ ἀληθείας cett.

(9) It is just to kill one's relatives, since Orestes and Alcmaeon did it; and God declared that they acted justly.

(10) I shall turn to the arts and poetic gifts. In the composition of tragedies and the painting of pictures, whoever is most deceptive in imitating the truth is best. Let me provide an example from an older poem. Cleoboulina says:

I saw a man stealing and deceiving by guile,
and to act by force is the most just thing to do.

(12) This is an ancient statement. The following lines come from Aeschylus:

God does not hold back from just deception

<and·>

God sometimes recognizes a time for lies.

(13) An account opposing this one is also current, that the just and the unjust are distinct, differing in fact as in name. If one should ask those who hold the view that the unjust is the same as the just, whether they have ever acted justly towards their parents, they will say they have. It follows that they have acted unjustly, since they agree the unjust and the just are the same thing. (14) Here is another argument: if you know some man who is just, then he is unjust, and tall and short by the same argument. And <if> your opponent says, “Let him die for his great injustices,” then let him die for accomplishing <many just acts>. (15) Enough of these arguments. I shall proceed to the arguments of those who claim to prove the just and the unjust are the same thing. (16) The argument that to steal your enemies' property is just, proves that it is also unjust, if their argument is true, and so on in all other cases. (17) And they appeal to the arts in which there is no just and unjust. In fact, poets do not compose their poems to tell the truth, but only to please men.

4 On truth and falsity

There are also competing accounts of the false and the true. One maintains that false speech is one thing, true another. But some people say they are the same.

(2) κἀγὼ τόνδε λέγω· πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγονται· ἔπειτα δέ, ὅταν λόγος ῥηθῆι, αἱ μὲν ὡς <κα>¹ λέγεται ὁ λόγος, οὕτω γεγνηται,² ἀλαθῆς ὁ λόγος, αἱ³ δὲ μὴ γεγνηται,⁴ ψευδῆς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. (3) αὐτίκα κατηγορεῖ ἱεροσυλίαν τῶ· αἱ γὰρ⁵ ἐγένετο τῶργον, ἀλαθῆς ὁ λόγος· αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐγένετο, ψεύστας· καὶ τῶ ἀπολογουμένῳ αὐτὸς⁶ λόγος· καὶ τὰ γε δικαστήρια τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ψεύσταν καὶ ἀλαθῆ κρῖνonti. (4) ἔπειτα τοῖ⁷ ἐξῆς καθημένοι αἱ λέγοιμεν⁸ “μύστας⁹ εἰμί,” τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν πάντες ἐροῦμεν, ἀλαθῆς δὲ μόνος ἐγώ, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰμί. (5) δᾶλον ὦν, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῶι παρῆι τὸ ψεῦδος, ψεύστας ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀλαθῆς, ἀλαθῆς (ὡσπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ παῖς καὶ νεανίσκος καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρον, ἐστίν).

(6) λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὡς ἄλλος εἶη ὁ ψεύστας λόγος, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἀλαθῆς, διαφέρων τῶνυμα <ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα>.¹⁰ αἱ γὰρ τις ἐρωτάσαι τὸς λέγοντας, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος εἶη ψεύστας καὶ ἀλαθῆς, ὃν αὐτοὶ λέγοντι, πότερος ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν “ψεύστας,” δᾶλον ὅτι δύο εἶη· αἱ δ’ “ἀλαθῆς” ἀποκρίναιτο,¹¹ καὶ ψεύστας ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος· καὶ¹² ἀλαθῆ τις¹³ ποκα εἶπεν ἢ ἐξεμαρτύρησε, καὶ ψευδῆ ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα· καὶ αἱ τινὰ ἀνδρα ἀλαθῆ οἶδε, καὶ ψεύσταν τὸν αὐτόν. (7) ἐκ δὲ τῶ λόγῳ λέγοντι ταῦτα, ὅτι γενομένῳ μὲν τῶ πρᾶγματος ἀλαθῆ τὸν λόγον <λέγοντι>,¹⁴ ἀγενήτω δὲ ψεύσταν· οὐκων διαφέρει <αὐτῶν τῶνυμα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα. (8) ἐρωτάσαι δὲ κά τις>¹⁵ αὔθις τὼς δικαστᾶς, ὃ τι κρῖνonti¹⁶ (οὐ γὰρ πάρεντι τοῖς πρᾶγμασιν). (9) ὁμολογέοντι δὲ καὶ αὐτοί, ὦι μὲν τὸ ψεῦδος ἀναμείκται, ψεύσταν ἦμεν, ὦι δὲ τὸ ἀλαθῆς, ἀλαθῆ· τοῦτο δὲ ὄλον διαφέρει.

5

ταῦτά¹⁷ τοὶ μαινόμενοι καὶ τοὶ σωφρονούντες καὶ τοὶ σοφοὶ καὶ τοὶ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ λέγοντι καὶ πράσσοντι. (2) καὶ πρᾶτον μὲν ὀνομάζοντι ταῦτά, γὰν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον καὶ πῦρ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα· καὶ ποίεοντι ταῦτά,¹⁸ κάθηνται καὶ ἔσθοντι καὶ πίνοντι καὶ κατάκεινται, καὶ τᾶλλα καττωυτό. (3) καὶ μᾶν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ μέζον καὶ μῆιόν ἐστι καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλασσον καὶ βαρύτερον καὶ κουφότερον· οὕτω γὰρ ἐντι¹⁹ ταῦτά²⁰ πάντα· (4) τὸ τάλαντόν ἐστι βαρύτερον τῆς μνᾶς, καὶ κουφότερον τῶν δύο ταλάντων· τωυτόν ἄρα καὶ κουφότερον καὶ βαρύτερον.

¹ suppl. Blass. ² Blass: γένηται codd. ³ αἱ . . . αἱ P3: ἄν . . . ἄν cert.

⁴ Blass: γένηται codd. ⁵ Diels: κ codd. ⁶ Wilamowitz: ὡς γε ὁ codd.

⁷ ἔπειτα τοὶ Diels: ἐπεὶ τοὶ καὶ codd. ⁸ North: λέγοι μὲν Y1-2: λέγοιμεν cert.

⁹ μύσας LZ: Μίμας Stephanus. ¹⁰ suppl. Diels.

¹¹ P3: ἀποκρίναιτο cert.: secl. Schanz. ¹² Diels: καὶ codd.

¹³ ἀλαθῆ τις North: ἀλαθῆς τί codd. ¹⁴ suppl. Diels. ¹⁵ suppl. Diels.

¹⁶ Schanz: κρῖνonti codd. ¹⁷ North: ταῦτα, ταυτα codd.

¹⁸ Meibom bis: ταῦτα bis codd. ¹⁹ Diels: εἶη codd. ²⁰ Meibom: ταῦτα codd.

(2) I say the latter: first, they are said with the same words; second, if, as the speech is spoken, so it has come to pass, the speech is true; but if it has not come to pass, then the same speech is false. (3) For instance, a speech accuses someone of robbing a temple. If this action took place, the speech is true; if it did not happen, it is false. And the same account applies to the speech of the defendant. And the courts judge the same speech to be false and true. Moreover, if as we are seated together we say, “I am an initiate of the mysteries,” we shall all be saying the same thing, but I alone am speaking the truth, since I alone really am an initiate. (5) So it is clear that the same speech, when falsehood attends it, is false, but when truth attends it, is true (just as a person is the same as a child, youth, man, and old man).

(6) There is also the account that false speech is one thing, true speech another, differing in name <as in fact>. For if someone should ask those who maintain that the same speech is false and true, which their own speech is: if they say “false,” then clearly there are two things; if they answer “true,” the same speech is also false. And if someone speaks or testifies truly, he does the same falsely; and if one knows an honest man, one also knows the same man is a liar. (7) On the basis of this argument, they say this, that if the corresponding fact occurs, <they utter> a true speech; if it does not, a false one. So it is not <the name> that is variable, <but the fact. (8) And one might ask> the jurors in turn what they are judging, for they are not witnesses to the facts. (9) They themselves would agree that what has the false mixed in it is false, what has the true is true. And this whole differs.

5 [On madness and sanity]

The mad and the sane, the wise and the ignorant say and do the same things.

(2) First, they use the same words: “earth,” “man,” “horse,” “fire,” and the rest. And they do the same things: they sit, eat, drink, sleep, and so on. (3) Furthermore, the same thing is both larger and smaller, more and less, heavier and lighter. Thus they are all the same. (4) A talent is heavier than a pound and lighter than two talents. The same thing, therefore, is both lighter and heavier.

(5) καὶ ζῶει ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ ζῶει, καὶ ταῦτ' ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι· τὰ γὰρ τῆιδ' ἔοντα ἐν ταῖς Λιβύαις οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδέ γε τὰ ἐν Λιβύαις ἐν Κύπρῳ. καὶ τὰλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. οὐκῶν καὶ ἐντὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὐκ ἐντί.

(6) τοὶ τῆνα² λέγοντες, τῶς μαινομένως καὶ <τῶς σωφροῦντας καὶ>³ τῶς σοφῶς καὶ τῶς ἀμαθείς τούτ' ἀπαρτίζονται καὶ λέγουσιν, καὶ τὰλλα <τὰ>⁴ ἐπόμενα τῷ λόγῳ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν. (7) αἱ γὰρ τις αὐτῶς⁵ ἐρωτάσαι,⁶ αἱ διαφέρει μανία σωφροσύνης καὶ σοφία ἀμαθείας, φαντί· “ναί.” (8) εὖ γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν πράσσονται ἑκάτεροι δᾶλοι ἐντί, ὡς ὁμολογοῦσιν. οὐκῶν αἱ⁷ ταῦτα πράσσονται, καὶ τοὶ σοφοὶ μαινόμενοι, καὶ τοὶ μαινόμενοι σοφοί, καὶ πάντα συνταράσσονται. (9) καὶ ἑπακτέος⁸ ὁ λόγος, πότερον⁹ ὧν¹⁰ ἐν δέονται τοὶ σωφροῦντες λέγουσιν ἢ τοὶ μαινόμενοι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ φαντί, ὡς ταῦτ'¹¹ μὲν λέγουσιν, ὅταν τις αὐτῶς ἐρωτῆι· ἀλλὰ τοὶ μὲν σοφοὶ ἐν τῷ δέονται, τοὶ δὲ μαινόμενοι αἱ¹² οὐ δεῖ. (10) καὶ τοῦτο λέγοντες δοκοῦντι μικρὸν ποτιθῆναι <τὸ>¹³ αἱ δεῖ καὶ μὴ δεῖ, ὥστε μηκέτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἦμεν. (11) ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἀρμόνιος τοσοῦτον¹⁴ ποτιθεῖντος ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δοκῶ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλ' ἀρμόνιος διαλλαγείσας· ὡσπερ “Γλαῦκος” καὶ “γλαυκός” καὶ “Ξάνθος” καὶ “ξανθός” καὶ “Ξοῦθος” καὶ “ξουθός.” (12) ταῦτα μὲν τὴν ἀρμόνιον ἀλλάξαντα διήνεικαν, τὰ δὲ μακρῶς καὶ βραχυτέρως ῥηθέντα· “Τύρος” καὶ “τυρός” “σάκος”¹⁵ καὶ “σακός,”¹⁶ ἄτερα δὲ γράμματα διαλλάξαντα· “κάρτος” καὶ “κρατός,”¹⁷ “ὄνος” καὶ “νόος.” (13) ἐπεὶ ὧν οὐκ ἀφαιρεθέντος οὐδενὸς τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, τί δή, αἱ τίς ἢ ποτιθῆθαι τι ἢ ἀφαιρεῖ; καὶ τοῦτο δεῖξω οἶόν ἐστιν. (14) αἱ τίς ἀπὸ τῶν δέκα ἐν ἀφέλοι, οὐκέτι δέκα οὐδὲ ἐν <κ>¹⁸ εἶη, καὶ τὰλλα καττωτό.¹⁹ (15) τὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἦμεν καὶ μὴ ἦμεν, ἐρωτῶ· “τί ἢ τὰ πάντα ἔστιν;” οὐκῶν αἱ τίς μὴ φαίη ἦμεν, ψεύδεται, “τὰ πάντα” εἰπῶν.²⁰ ταῦτα πάντα ὧν πηι ἔστι.

6 <Περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, αἱ διδασκόντες>²¹

λέγεται δὲ τις λόγος οὐτ' ἀλαθῆς οὔτε καινός²² ὅτι²³ ἄρα σοφία καὶ ἀρετὰ οὔτε διδασκόντες εἶη οὔτε μαθητόν. τοὶ δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντες ταῖς ἀποδείξεσι χρωμένων.

¹ καὶ ταῦτ' Mullach: καττωτό codd. ² τοὶ τῆνα Diels: τοὶ τινες codd.

³ suppl. Blass. ⁴ suppl. Blass. ⁵ ἐν γὰρ τις αὐτῶς P4 P6 V2.

⁶ Fabricius: ἐρωτάσαι codd. ⁷ Mullach: καὶ codd.

⁸ Wilamowitz: ἐπ' ἀργεῖος F2: ἐπ' ἄργεος P4 P6: ἐπ' ἀρτεος, ἐπάρτεος cett.

⁹ F2 R: καὶ πότερον P4 V2: πρότερον cett. ¹⁰ Wilamowitz: οἶον codd.

¹¹ Fabricius: ταῦτα codd. ¹² Blass: αἱ codd. ¹³ suppl. Diels.

¹⁴ Wilamowitz: τοσοῦτω codd. ¹⁵ σάκος LZ. ¹⁶ Weber: σάκος Z: σάκος cett.

¹⁷ Wilamowitz: κράτος codd. ¹⁸ suppl. Blass. ¹⁹ Meibom: καττωτό codd.

²⁰ Mullach: εἰπόντες codd. ²¹ suppl. Stephanus. ²² R: καινός cett. ²³ Stephanus: τίς codd.

(5) And the same man is both alive and not alive, and the same things both are and are not. For the things that are here are not in Africa, nor are the things in Africa in Cyprus. And so on by the same argument. Hence things both are and are not.

(6) Those who say these things, that the mad and <the sane>, the wise and the ignorant accomplish and say the same things, and everything else that follows from this theory, are wrong. (7) For if someone should ask them whether madness differs from sanity and wisdom from ignorance, they would say, “Yes.” (8) For everyone effectively reveals himself by his actions, as assenting to this view. Hence if they do the same things, the wise are mad and the mad wise, and everything is confounded. (9) The question should be raised whether the wise or the mad speak in the right situation. For they maintain that they say the same things, whenever someone asks them, but with the proviso that the wise speak in the right situation, the mad do not. (10) And if they admit this, they seem to be making a small addition concerning <what> is right and what is not, but it is no longer the same. (11) I do not think the facts are altered so much by the addition of a thing, as by the change of arrangement, such as the accent of “Glaucus/bright,” “Xanthus/yellow,” and “Xouthus/nimble.” (12) By a change of accent these become different, while some words differ by the vowel being pronounced long or shorter. Depending on the placement of the accent and length of vowel, *tyros* can stand for “Tyre” [*Tūros*] or “cheese” [*tūros*], *sakos* for “sack” [*sākos*] or “enclosure” [*sākos*]; and other words can be created by interchanging letters, as in *kartos/kratos* (“power”/“head’s”¹) or *onos/noos* (“donkey”/“mind”). (13) If words can differ so much when nothing is taken away, think what happens if one adds or takes something away! – as I shall now show. (14) If someone takes one away from ten, there <would> no longer be ten or even one, and so on in other cases. (15) As far as the same man both being and not being, I ask: “Is he in some respect or completely?” If then the answerer denies the man’s existence, he errs in saying “completely.” Thus in some way all these things are.

6 <On wisdom and virtue, whether they are teachable>

There is a current theory that is neither true nor new, that wisdom and virtue are neither teachable nor learnable. Those who hold this view advance these proofs.

¹ Here *kratos* must be the genitive of *kras* “head”; otherwise it would be just a variant spelling of the same word.

(2) ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶη, αἶ τι¹ ἄλλωι παραδοίης, τοῦτο αὐτὸν² ἔτι ἔχειν. μία μὲν δὴ αὐτα. (3) ἄλλα δέ, ὡς, αἶ διδακτὸν ἦν, διδάσκαλοι κα ἀποδεδεγμένοι ἦν, ὡς τᾶς μωσικᾶς. (4) τρίτα δέ, ὡς τοῖ ἐν ταῖ Ἑλλάδι γενόμενοι σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τὰ αὐτῶν³ τέχνα ἄν⁴ ἐδίδαξαν καὶ τὼς φίλωσ.⁵ (5) τέταρτα δέ, ὅτι ἤδη τινὲς παρὰ⁶ σοφιστᾶς ἐλθόντες οὐδὲν ὠφέληθεν. (6) πέμπτα δέ, ὅτι πολλοὶ οὐ συγγενόμενοι σοφισταῖς ἄξιοι λόγῳ γεγένηται.

(7) ἐγὼ δὲ κάρτα εὐήθη νομίζω τόνδε τὸν λόγον· γινώσκω γὰρ τὼς διδασκάλωσ γράμματα διδάσκοντασ ἃ καὶ αὐτὸσ ἐπιστάμενοσ τυγχάνει, καὶ κιθαριστᾶσ κιθαρίζεν. πρὸσ δὲ τὰν δευτέραν ἀποδείξειν, ὡσ ἄρα οὐκ ἐντὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀποδεδεγμένοι, τί μὰν τοῖ σοφισταῖ διδάσκοντι ἄλλῃ σοφίαν καὶ ἀρετάν; (8) [ἦ]⁷ τί δὲ Ἀναξαγόρειοι καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι ἦεν; τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ἐδίδαξε Πολύκλειτοσ τὸν υἱὸν ἀνδριάντασ ποιέν. (9) καὶ αἶ μὲν τισ μὴ ἐδίδαξε,⁸ οὐ σαμῆιον· αἶ δ' ἔστι διδάξει, τεκμάριον ὅτι δυνατὸν ἔστι διδάξει. (10) τέταρτον δέ, αἶ μὴ τοῖ παρὰ [σοφῶν]⁹ σοφιστῶν σοφοὶ γίνονται· καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον μαθόντεσ. (11) ἔστι δὲ τι¹⁰ καὶ φύσισ, αἶ δὴ¹¹ τισ μὴ μαθὼν παρὰ σοφιστᾶν ἱκανὸσ ἐγένετο, εὐφυῆσ καὶ γενόμενοσ, ῥαιδίωσ συναρπάξει τὰ πολλὰ, ὀλίγα μαθὼν παρ' ὧνπερ καὶ τὰ ὀνύματα μαθάνομεν· καὶ τούτων τι ἦτοῖ πλέον, ἦτοῖ ἔλασσον, ὁ μὲν παρὰ πατρός, ὁ δὲ παρὰ ματρός. (12) αἶ δὲ τωι μὴ πιστὸν ἔστι τὰ ὀνύματα μαθάνειν ἁμέ,¹² ἀλλ' ἐπισταμένωσ ἅμα γίνεσθαι, γνῶτω ἐκ τῶνδε· αἶ τισ εὐθύσ γενόμενον παιδίον ἐσ Πέρσασ ἀποπέμψαι καὶ τηνεὶ τράφοι, κωφὸν Ἑλλάδοσ φωνᾶσ, περσίζοι κα· αἶ τισ τηνόθεν τῆιδε κομίζοι, ἔλλανίζοι κα. οὕτω μαθάνομεν τὰ ὀνύματα, καὶ τὼσ διδασκάλωσ οὐκ ἴσαμεσ.¹³ (13) οὕτω¹⁴ λέλεκταὶ μοι ὁ λόγωσ, καὶ ἔχεισ ἀρχῆν καὶ τέλος καὶ μέσα· καὶ οὐ λέγω, ὡσ διδακτὸν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ¹⁵ ἀποχρῶντί μοι τῆνα αἶ ἀποδείξεισ.

7

λέγοντι δὲ τινεσ τῶν δαμαγορούντων, ὡσ χρῆ τὰσ ἀρχὰσ ἀπὸ κλάρω γίνεσθαι, οὐ βέλτιστα ταῦτα νομίζοντεσ. (2) εἶ γὰρ τισ αὐτὸν ἐρωτῶι τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα, “τί δὴ σὺ τοῖσ οἰκέταισ οὐκ ἀπὸ κλήρω τὰ ἔργα προστάσσεισ,¹⁶ ὅπωσ ὁ μὲν ζευγηλάτασ, αἶ κ' ὀφοποιὸσ λάχηι, ὀφοποιῆι,¹⁷ ὁ δὲ ὀφοποιὸσ ζευγηλατῆι, καὶ τᾶλλα καττωυτό¹⁸;

¹ αἶ τι P4 P6: ἄν cett. ² P4 P6: αὐτὸ cett. ³ Stephanus: αὐτῶν codd.

⁴ τὰν αὐτῶν τέχνασ W. Schulze.

⁵ καὶ τὼσ φίλωσ L ad mg.: καὶ πὼσ φίλωσι cett.: κα τὼσ φίλωσ W. Schulze.

⁶ Stephanus: περὶ codd. ⁷ secl. Wilamowitz. ⁸ Diels: μὴ διδάξει codd.

⁹ secl. Blass. ¹⁰ Schanz: τισ codd. ¹¹ αἶ δὴ Diels: αἶ δὲ codd.

¹² Koen: ἅμε B P3 P4 P6 R V1: ἅμα cett. ¹³ οὐκ ἴσαμεσ Blass: οὐκ ἅμεσ codd.

¹⁴ Diels: οὐ codd. ¹⁵ Diels: ὅτι οὐκ F2: ὅτι cett. ¹⁶ L: προστάσσεισ cett.

¹⁷ Matth. d. Varis: ὀφοποιᾶ codd. ¹⁸ Diels: κατὰ τοῦτο codd.

(2) It would not be possible, if you gave something to another, to still have it. This is one proof. (3) Second, if it were teachable, there would be recognized teachers of it, as of music. (4) Third, the wise men who lived in Greece would have taught their children and friends. (5) Fourth, some who have come to study with the sophists have not improved themselves at all. (6) Fifth, many who have not studied with the sophists have become successful.

(7) I consider this view quite naive. For I know teachers who teach letters which each happens to know himself, and lyre-players who teach the lyre. In reply to the second proof, that there are no recognized teachers, what else do the sophists teach but wisdom and virtue? (8) And what about the followers of Anaxagoras and Pythagoras? Third, Polyclitus taught his son to sculpt statues. (9) And even if someone did not teach his skill, that proves nothing; but if he *can* teach it, that would be evidence that the skill can be taught. (10) Fourth, that some who study with the sophists do not become wise: well, many who have studied letters have not learned how to read. (11) There is a natural ability by means of which someone who does not study with the sophists proves able, if he is indeed gifted, to grasp many things easily after learning a few things from those from whom we also learn words. And one man learns something of these things, either more or less, from his father, another from his mother. (12) But if someone does not believe that we can learn words, but we are born knowing them, let him consider this: if one sent off a child to Persia as soon as he was born and the child was raised there without hearing the Greek language, he would speak Persian. If someone should bring a child here from there, he would speak Greek. Thus we learn words, even though we cannot name our teachers. (13) There you have my argument, with its beginning, middle, and end. And I do not maintain that these things are teachable, but only that I regard the aforesaid proofs as inadequate.

7 [On choosing by lot]

Some popular leaders claim that people should be chosen to rule by lot, on the basis of bad reasoning. (2) What if one should ask the proponent of this view, “why don’t you appoint tasks to your slaves by lot, so that your driver, if he draws the lot of a cook, should cook, while the cook drives the team, and so on?”

(3) καὶ πῶς οὐ καὶ τῶς χαλκῆς καὶ τῶς σκυτῆς συναγαγόντες καὶ τέκτονας καὶ χρυσοχόας διεκλαρώσαμεν καὶ ἠναγκάσαμεν, ἂν χ¹ ἕκαστος λάχῃ τέχνην ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἂν² ἐπίσταται;” (4) ταυτόν δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀγῶσι τὰς μουσικὰς διακλαρώσει τῶς ἀγωνιστὰς καὶ ὁ τι χ³ ἕκαστος [κα]³ λάχῃ, ἀγωνίζεσθαι· αὐλητὰς κιθαριεῖ⁴ τυχόν καὶ κιθαρῶιδος αὐλήσει· καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ [τῶς] τοξότας καὶ [τῶς]⁵ ὀπλίτας ἵππασεῖται, ὁ δὲ ἵππευς τοξεύσει, ὥστε πάντες ἂ οὐκ ἐπίστανται οὐδὲ δύνανται, [οὐδὲ]⁶ πραξοῦντι.

(5) λέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἦμεν καὶ δαμοτικὸν κάρτα· ἐγὼ ἦκιστα νομίζω δαμοτικόν. ἐντὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι μισόδομοι ἄνθρωποι, ὧν αἱ καὶ τύχη ὁ κύαμος, ἀπολοῦντι τὸν δᾶμον. (6) ἀλλὰ χρῆ τὸν δᾶμον αὐτὸν ὀρῶντα αἰρεῖσθαι πάντας τῶς εὖνως αὐτῷ, καὶ τῶς ἐπιταδείως στραταγῆν, ἀτέρως δὲ νομοφυλακῆν καὶ τᾶλλα.

8

<τῷ αὐτῷ>⁷ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς⁸ τέχνας νομίζω κατὰ βραχὺ τε δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι,⁹ καὶ <τῶν>¹⁰ ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ δικάσασθαι¹¹ ὀρθῶς, καὶ δαμαγορεῖν οἷόν τ’ ἦμεν, καὶ λόγων τέχνας ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων ὡς τε ἔχει καὶ ὡς ἐγένετο, διδάσκειν. (2) καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων εἰδῶς, πῶς οὐ δύνασεται περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς καὶ¹² πράσσειν; (3) ἔτι δὲ ὁ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων εἰδῶς ἐπίστασεται καὶ περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς λέγειν. (4) δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν, περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται, περὶ τούτων λέγειν. <περὶ>¹³ πάντων γὰρ ἐπίστασεται. (5) πάντων μὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγων τὰς τέχνας ἐπίσταται, τοῖ δὲ λόγοι πάντες περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐ<όντων ἐντί>.¹⁴ (6) δεῖ δὲ ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν, περὶ ὧν καὶ λέγει, ¹⁵ <τὰ πράγματα>,¹⁶ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ὀρθῶς διδάσκειν τὴν πόλιν πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ τῶς κωλύειν. (7) εἰδῶς δὲ ταῦτα¹⁷ εἰδήσει καὶ τὰ ἄτερα τούτων· πάντα γὰρ ἐπίστασεται· ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν πάντων τῆνα, <ὁ>¹⁸ δὲ ποτὶ ταυτόν τὰ δέοντα πράξει, αἱ¹⁹ χρῆ. (8) κἂν μὴ²⁰ ἐπίσταται²¹ αὐλέν, αἱ²² δύνασεται αὐλέν, αἱ καὶ δέηι τοῦτο πράσσειν.

¹ ἂν χ North: ἀνασχ codd. ² P₃: ἂν cett. ³ secl. Blass.

⁴ Wilamowitz: κιθαριζέτω codd. ⁵ bis secl. Wilamowitz. ⁶ secl. Schanz.

⁷ suppl. Blass: lacunam 8–10 litt. hab. codd. ⁸ καὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς Blass: κατὰ τᾶς αὐτᾶς codd.

⁹ North: καὶ ἀλέγεσθαι codd. ¹⁰ suppl. Wilamowitz.

¹¹ F₂: δικάζειν ἐπίστασθαι Wilamowitz: διδασκᾶσθαι cett.

¹² <τῶν πόλιν διδάσκειν> Diels. ¹³ suppl. Rohde. ¹⁴ suppl. Orelli (lacunam c. 4 litt.).

¹⁵ καὶ λέγει Blass: καὶ λέγοι codd. ¹⁶ suppl. Diels (lacunam 4–5 litt.).

¹⁷ Diels: γε αὐτὰ codd. ¹⁸ suppl. Diels.

¹⁹ πράξει, αἱ Wilamowitz: πράξει Diels: πρασσεῖται vel παρασσεῖται codd.

²⁰ κἂν μὴ codd.: καὶ μὲν Diels. ²¹ T. M. Robinson: ἐπίσταται codd.

²² Diels (=ἀεῖ): αἱ, αἱ codd.

(3) Why should we not bring together blacksmiths and shoemakers, builders and goldsmiths, and choosing lots compel each one to practice whatever trade he draws instead of the one he is familiar with?” (4) In this way contestants in a music competition should draw lots, and whatever instrument they draw, they perform on: the flautist may by chance play the lyre and the lyre-player the flute. And in war the archers and infantrymen will be in the cavalry, and the cavalryman will draw the bow, so that everyone will do what he does not know how or have the ability to do.

(5) They say this is good and very democratic. But I think it is hardly democratic. For there are those in cities who hate the people, and if one of them is chosen by lot, he will overthrow the popular government. (6) But the people themselves should be watchful and elect all those who are favorable to them, and suitable commanders to lead them in war, and others to protect the laws and so on.

"The Importance of Rhetorical

8 [On knowledge of speech and things] **Training" (Dillon/Gergel)**

I believe that it belongs to <the same> man and the same art to be able to converse briefly, to know <the> truth about things, to know how to plead one's case rightly, to be able to speak in public assemblies, to know the art of words, and to teach the nature of all things, how they are and how they came to be. (2) And first, will not he who knows the nature of all things also be able to act rightly in all cases? (3) Further, he who knows the art of words will know also how to speak about all things. (4) For he who would speak rightly must speak about the things he knows; for he will know <about> all things. (5) For he knows the art of all speeches, and all speeches <are> about everything <that is>. (6) He who would speak rightly concerning whatever things he speaks, must know <the facts> and how to instruct the city correctly to do what is good and to instruct the citizens to avoid what is bad. (7) If he knows these things he will know things different from them too, for he will know everything. For the same things are the elements of all things, and <one> who encounters the same situation will do what is fitting, if one should. (8) Even if one does not know how to play the flute, one will always be able to play the flute, if one needs to do so.

(9) τὸν δὲ δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπίστασθαι ὀρθῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων¹ ταὶ δίκαια.² εἰδῶς δὲ τοῦτο, εἰδήσει καὶ τὸ ὑπεναντίον αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ <τούτων> ἄτερα.³ (10) δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τῶς νόμους ἐπίστασθαι πάντας· αἱ τοίνυν τὰ πράγματα μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, οὐδὲ τῶς νόμους. (11) τὸν γὰρ ἐν μωσικῇ νόμον τίς ἐπίσταται; ὅσπερ καὶ μωσικῆν· ὃς δὲ μὴ μωσικῆν, οὐδὲ τὸν νόμον. (12) ὃς γὰρ <μὴ>⁴ τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίσταται, εὐπετής⁵ ὁ λόγος, ὅτι πάντα ἐπίσταται· (13) ὃς δὲ <καὶ κατὰ>⁶ βραχὺ <διαλέγεσθαι δύναται>⁷ δεῖ νιν ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, περὶ πάντων· οὐκῶν δὲ νιν πάντ' ἐπίστασθαι.

9

μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἐξεύρημα εὑρηται ἐς τὸν βίον μνάμα, καὶ ἐς πάντα χρήσιμον, ἐς φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ σοφίαν.⁸ (2) ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο <πρῶτον>.⁹ ἔαν προσέχηις τὸν νοῦν, διὰ τούτων παρελθοῦσα ἄ γνώμα μάλλον αἰσθησέεται. (3) δεῦτερον¹⁰ δὲ μελετᾶν, αἱ κα ἀκούσηις· τῷ¹¹ γὰρ πολλάκις ταῦτα¹² ἀκούσαι καὶ εἶπαι ἐς μνάμαν παρεγένετο σύνολον ὃ ἐμαθες.¹³ (4) τρίτον αἱ κα ἀκούσηις ἐπὶ τὰ¹⁴ οἶδας καταθέσθαι, οἷον τόδε· δεῖ μεμνᾶσθαι Χρῦσιππον, κατθέμεν ἐπὶ τὸν χρυσὸν καὶ τὸν ἵππον. (5) ἄλλο· Πυριλάμπη κατθέμεν ἐπὶ <τὸ>¹⁵ πῦρ καὶ τὸ λάμπειν. τάδε μὲν περὶ τῶν ὀνυμάτων. (6) τὰ δὲ πράγματα οὕτως· περὶ ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄρη καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα, περὶ χαλκείας δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἥφαιστον, περὶ δειλίας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἐπειόν. * * *

¹ P₃: τούτων cett. ² Blass: τὰ δίκαια codd.

³ <τούτων> Diels: ἄτερα Trieber: τῶς νόμους [lac.] τερεία P₄ P₆: τὰ [lac.] τερεία cett.

⁴ suppl. Wilamowitz. ⁵ Matth. d. Varis: ἀπετής codd.

⁶ suppl. Diels. ⁷ διαλέγεσθαι δύναται Blass: + αἱ κα Diels.

⁸ ἐς τὴν σοφίαν τε καὶ ἐς τὸν βίον Wilamowitz. ⁹ suppl. Schanz.

¹⁰ North: δευτέραν codd. ¹¹ Schanz: τὸ codd. ¹² P₃ Y₂: ταῦτα cett.

¹³ σύνολον ὃ ἐμαθες huc trans. Diels; post αἰσθησέεται codd.

¹⁴ ἐπὶ τὰ Matt. d. Varis: ἐπειτα codd. ¹⁵ suppl. Blass.

(9) One who knows how to judge court cases must rightly understand justice, for trials are about this. If one knows this, one will know the opposite of this and what is different <from these>. (10) He must know all the laws; yet if he does not know the facts, he will not know the laws either. (11) Who knows the rules of music? Whoever also knows music; he who does not know music, does not know the rules either. (12) <Indeed,> whoever knows the true facts, as it is easy to argue, knows all things. (13) And whoever <is able to make> a brief explanation must be able to answer a questioner on any subject. Accordingly, he must know everything.

9 [On memory]

The greatest and fairest discovery for life is found to be memory, which is beneficial for everything: for philosophy as well as for wisdom. (2) This is the first step: if you pay attention, as you pass through experiences your mind will perceive things better. (3) Second, to repeat what you hear. For by often hearing and saying the same things, the whole of what you have learned is committed to memory. (4) Third, whatever you hear refer to what you already know, for example: to remember the name 'Chrysippus' think of gold (*chrysos*) and a horse (*hippos*). (5) Another example: for Pyrilampes think of fire (*pyr*) and shining (*lampein*). That is how to learn names. (6) Learn objects like this: for courage think of Ares and Achilles; for bronze-work think of Hephaestus; for cowardice think of Epeius. * * *

Commentary

There is an edition of the *Dissoi Logoi* with text, translation, and commentary in Robinson 1979, which I have generally followed in my text and drawn on in my translation and commentary. Although it was subsequently suggested that this work is a late, even Byzantine, school exercise (see Conley 1985), Robinson and most scholars agree that it was written around 400 BC, by someone who was most influenced by Protagoras (41, 72–73). The odd Doric of the text suggests an author whose native dialectic is Ionic, and who has translated his own lecture notes into Doric for teaching purposes (51–54). The usual title *Dissoi Logoi*, which might be rendered more literally as *Paired Arguments*, derives from the opening words; Henricus Stephanus gave the work the title *Dialexeis*, “Lectures.”

The first four sections of the work present rival arguments (although not quite opposing arguments, for reasons to be explained), while the next four deal with common topics and last deals with mnemonics. In general the treatise seems to offer a course in oratory, and perhaps the kind of material included in textbooks (*technai*) of the time.

1. The general pattern of exposition is the same in sections 1–4: there is a debate between those who say two contrary things are the same, and those who say they are different. The former view is rehearsed, then the latter. The assumptions and the style of argument are roughly the same in each section.

Here “good” and “bad” do not seem to carry moral overtones; even the sexual relations are brought up not for the moral questions they raise, but to consider when it is healthy to engage in them. The question is in every case about some sort of immediate advantage or disadvantage to the agent. Terms with (partly) moral implications are brought up in the next two sections.

To support the claim that good and bad are the same, the author trots out a series of examples in which some action is good for one party and bad for another, or good for someone in one condition and bad for someone in a different condition. Thus victory is good for the victor but bad for the vanquished; sex is good for the healthy but bad for the sick. In general, action *A* is good for *S* but bad for *T*, where *S* and *T* are persons or classes of persons in a different condition or situation. This general account is one which today would be dealt with by describing “good” in the sense intended as an incomplete predicate which must be filled in with reference to some subject before a truth value can be assigned.

The cases seem almost trivial, but Plato puts a similar argument in the mouth of Protagoras, and shows the audience enthusiastically applauding (Prt47). We may suppose that at some time this was considered an impressive piece of reasoning.

The opposed position consists of showing the absurdity of identifying good and bad: whatever we say is good turns out to be bad and vice versa. What is curious about this opposition is that the two views are *not* really opposed: one is a thesis about the denotation of respective terms (when suitably filled out),

showing that the same action can be characterized by both “good” and “bad.” The other thesis is about the connotation of the terms, showing that they cannot be identical. Yet the proponent of the former view does not hold that the two terms *mean* the same thing; indeed, the whole point of holding the view is to show that two contrary predicates can apply to the same subject. Thus the argument for the second theory does not refute the first theory at all. The author of the *Dissoi Logoi*, however, does not seem to recognize the irrelevance of the second argument to the first position.

One might complain that the first theory is misstated. What the evidence shows is not that good and bad are the same thing, but that the same things are both good and bad (in different respects or situations). At best it shows that a good thing is (extensionally) identical with a bad thing, not that goodness is identical with badness.

The author presents a mini-dialogue in (12–14), which shows how the proponent of the second theory could refute an opponent, reminding us that this treatise is about how to win arguments.

2. The properties of right and wrong include moral judgments, and also more general considerations of what is proper and improper (e.g. running away in a race). The discussion in (2) of what is right relative to a lover and a non-lover remind one of Lysias’ speech in Plato’s *Phaedrus* (230e–234c). Examples in (2–8) focus on different situations and statuses within the state. Examples in (9–17) focus on customs and practices in different Greek states and different foreign cultures. The case of scalping in Scythia (13) is reported in Herodotus 4.64. The case of the Massagetae’s eating their relatives (14) is reported in Herodotus 1.216, and a similar custom of an Indian tribe is used to show the power (and diversity) of custom (Herodotus 3.38). For problems with the thought experiment here, see Gera 2000.

The author demonstrates his erudition with a poem (unknown, 19). The positive view is that everything is fitting in its *kairos*, or proper context or situation. Evidently we need to consider each action in relation to the cultural context, the social status of the agent, the relevant customs and conditions that apply, age, sex, situation, and so on. Given all the details, a proper determination can be made as to what is right in the circumstances; the judgment is neither subjective nor arbitrary. What will be right for one agent may be wrong for another in a given situation, but there is a determinate right and wrong.

3. Here the author gives examples of actions that are normally considered unjust, at least when done to friends, such as lying. He discovers cases in which lying to friends and family is just. Similarly Socrates gives examples of good actions, such as returning what is owed, which can be unjust in some instances (Plato *Republic* 331b–c). Even robbing temples and swearing falsely, two of the worst crimes recognized, can be justified in certain circumstances.

4. The same sort of debate as found in the first three sections appears here applied to the notion of truth. The argument for sameness of truth and falsity seems to be: a sentence, such as, “the sky is blue,” is true just in case the sky is blue and

otherwise false. A true statement and a false statement are made with the same words (in different situations). Thus the same sentence is both true and false. Modern treatments would map the words to different statements or propositions on the one hand, or identify them as different speech acts in different situations. But even Aristotle would agree that the same sentence is both true and false (see Goldin 2002). In (3) it is not clear what speech (or sentence) the defendant uses that is the same as what the prosecutor uses. But we could imagine a *tu quoque* response: the prosecutor says, "You committed the crime"; the defendant replies, "No, *you* committed the crime" (given that political enemies often brought accusations against one another).

5. How this section fits with the others is not clear, especially since its opening words are missing; nevertheless, there are some similar arguments and issues raised. The mad and the sane do and say the same things, but the sane person does them in the right way at the right time, whereas the mad person does not. This evidence could be used to prove that madness and sanity are the same, but only in the limited way that truth and falsity, right and wrong are the same, that is: the same acts can have opposite properties.

In (3–4) we find that the same thing is smaller and larger, lighter and heavier, anticipating a kind of problem Plato puzzles over, for instance in the *Phaedo* (102b–103a). In (5) the series of examples is expanded to the conclusion that "things both are and are not." We then return to the question of madness and sanity. If the mad person and the sane person differ, it is by the fact that one does and says things when they are not fitting, the other when they are. This distinction, the author assures us, makes a big difference. Even a rearrangement, as in a shift of accent in a word, can change its meaning, and an addition can have a greater effect (as in arithmetic). Throughout the logic is difficult to follow and examples seem to overwhelm the slender thread of the argument.

6. The question of the teachability of wisdom and virtue has important connections to Socrates' views, as expressed notably in Plato's *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus* and *Meno*. The author gives five reasons for which some have held that wisdom and virtue are not teachable. The first is trivial, but the others are interesting, and some are used by Socrates in Plato's dialogues. In particular the second point (3) is brought up in *Meno* 96a–c, the third point (in 4) in *Protagoras* 319e–320b and *Meno* 93a ff.

The mention of Polyclitus the sculptor in (8) shows that the author is thinking of wisdom in such a way as to include artistic skill. The rejoinders in (9–10) are better made by Isocrates, *Against the Sophists* 14–15. For language learning as a model of education in (11–12), see Plato *Protagoras* 327e–328a = Prt46. The thought experiment of raising children from different parents in different environments to show the importance of the linguistic environment is valuable and convincing: see Gera 2000. In (13) the author stops with a refutation of arguments that virtue cannot be taught; he does not endorse the view that it can be taught. Barnes, *PP* 51, notes: "That passage makes, clearly and for the first time, the crucial distinction between rejecting an argument for a conclusion

and rejecting the conclusion itself. The art of criticism cannot thrive unless that distinction is grasped."

7. The choice of most magistrates by lot was a characteristic of Athenian democracy, and presumably practiced in other democratic governments as well. Here the author attacks it as inept, not from the viewpoint of an aristocrat, but from that of a democrat, concerned that it might tend to undermine the democracy. For a grudging defense of the practice, see [Xenophon] *The Constitution of the Athenians* 1–9.

8. Here we get an expansive view of sophistic skills such that knowing words and language entails knowing everything. Although the steps of the argument are not very clear, it appears that the author holds that knowing the art of words presupposes knowing the meanings of words, including the things they refer to; and this entails knowing contrary words and things, presumably, for instance, both justice and injustice. Thus a proper understanding of the art of words will entail a knowledge of the world. Knowing laws entails an ability to interpret and apply the laws. The author moves easily from knowing that to knowing how and vice versa (as in the music example in 11). Some of the claims here might be filled out in a plausible way by showing how a full understanding of, for instance, the language of the laws presupposes an understanding of legal procedures, the historical and social context, and so on. But as they stand, the claims seem hasty and superficial. Plato may be drawing on this argument in *Sophist* 232b–d; see Robinson 1977.

9. Mnemonics was a valuable skill to teach and learn when speeches had to be memorized. The presence of this topic shows the present treatise to be part of a kind of practical course of rhetoric.

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